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THE PERSISTENCE AND IMPORTANCE OF PATRIOTISM IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

BY
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WITH
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December 1982

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This report considers the impact of patriotic motives on decisions by youths to enlist in the Armed Forces and on their subsequent military service. The description is cast in a theoretical framework which challenges the wisdom of focusing primarily on levels of pay and other market oriented conditions of work when establishing military manpower policy.

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The views, opinions, and/or findings contained in this report are those of the authors and should not be construed as an official Department of the Army position, policy, or decision, unless so designated by other authorized documents.

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This report considers the impact of patriotic motives on decisions by youths to enlist in the armed forces and on their subsequent military service. It describes (a) how often those serving in the miltary claim to do so for patriotic reasons, (b) the sccial sources of patriotic attitudes, and (c) the behavioral consequences of being patriotically motivated for one's military career. The description is cast in a theoretical framework which challenges the practice of focusing primarily on levels of pay and other market-linked conditions of work when establishing military manpower policy. Normative and noneconomic factors, especially patriotic factors, must also be taken into account. We define patriotism as the readiness to act in the service of one's country.

Our principal conclusion is that patriotic motives play a persistent and important part in affecting the quality and composition of the all-volunteer force. Consequently, explanations of enlistment decisions based solely on a market model of society are unlikely to provide an adequate explanation of why youths volunteer for military service.

Evidence in support of our argument is based on an analysis of the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth--1980 and the 1979 AFEES survey. The main findings can be summarized as follows:

1. Models of the enlistment process, based solely on the economic approach, underestimate the importance of

normative and noneconomic factors.

2. Willingness to assert patriotic motives for enlisting has persisted through the years of the all-volunteer force and, today, can be regarded as the most important single reason explaining why youths enlist.

3. The distribution of patriotic attitudes among those serving in the military cross-cuts characteristic social structural positions defined by race, educational attainment, region, place of residence, and parent's occupation.

4. The transmission of patriotic attitudes is linked to interpersonal processes of primary group contact among family and friends, processes which other studies have shown to be crucial in shaping the orientation of youths toward military service. The substance of what microsocial processes transmit, however, varies with macrosociological factors defining the historical and cultural context.

5. People who enlist for patriotic reasons are more likely than others to fill roles which are central to the military's mission. Because patriotic attitudes are not systematically associated with social structural positions, their impact mitigates trends toward overrepresentation of disadvantaged youths in combat and military roles.

6. Whether measured subjectively or objectively, those who enlist for patriotic reasons are more effective role performers than those who enlist for other reasons.

These findings must be properly interpreted. They do not warrant crude marketing strategies by which "patriots" among youth could be identified as a special market segment toward

which to direct recruiting programs. Advertising programs that describe what the military does are more likely to be appropriate. Such descriptions define the current mission of the military and make clear its status as a special institution in which those who choose can work effectively to serve their country.

CHAPTER I

PATRIOTISM IN THE POST-VIETNAM PERIOD

1. Purpose and Scope

This report considers the impact of patriotic motives on decisions by youths to enlist in the armed forces and on their subsequent military service. It has two purposes, descriptive and analytic. The first purpose is to describe how often those serving in the military claim to do so for patriotic reasons, that is, as a service to their country. It is also to describe the social characteristics of those who make such claims and to see in what way (if any) they can be distinguished from their fellow-servers who make no similar claim. And it is to compare the experience of military life had by those who claim to be patriotically motivated with the military experience had by those who do not. These descriptions constitute the bulk of the report. The purpose may not seem to warrant the bulk, for who doubts the patriotic motives of American military personnel? Still the level of our ignorance about the relative importance of normative factors, of which the patriotic is one, in guiding youths to participate in the all-volunteer force is difficult to exaggerate. Only a limited number of empirical studies have been done which have data bearing on the issue and these have not always been analyzed with questions about

normative motives in mind. There is, then, a void which we hope to fill in what is known about how normative, especially about how patriotic, motives affect young people serving in the all-volunteer armed forces.

The second purpose is analytic. Students of military manpower policy have neglected to study the operation of patriotic motives at least in part because they have been guided in their thinking on this subject by a "market model" of society. A basic assumption of this model is that people act rationally to satisfy utilities. Society is believed to be comprised of "rational actors" who compete against one another to acquire things, whether material or not, which satisfy their particular wants. It is not impossible to talk about normative factors while adhering to such a model, but it is difficult. Neither the language of rational calculation or the image of competitive society geared to satisfy individual wants can easily capture the ideas of self-sacrifice or dutiful service to a political community which our ordinary notion of patriotism typically connotes. For this reason, primarily, but others as well (discussed in section 2 below), our conceptual apparatus for analyzing such complex normative motives as patriotism is not well-developed. We shall try here to remedy that problem somewhat by casting the descriptive parts of this report in terms of an analytic framework to be developed (later on) in this chapter.

The justification for pursuing either purpose is that patriotic motives are a more significant factor affecting enlistment decisions than is recognized by current

researchers and military manpower planners concerned with the subject. Our central thesis is that patriotic motives play a persistent and important part in affecting the quality and composition of the all-volunteer armed forces. Consequently, explanations of enlistment decisions based solely on the market model of social organization are unlikely to provide an adequate explanation of why youths volunteer for military service.

A basic question, of course, is whether there is evidence to permit evaluation of this thesis. There is, though certain limits on the availability of evidence do affect the scope of our study. First, the data most relevant to our concerns have been gathered in the 1970s or 1980. While there are earlier studies of reasons for enlistment which include questions about both economic and normative motives, the impact of the draft on decisions to enlist during the early post-World War II period makes it hard to use these data for comparison with the current situation. Our claims are limited temporally to the post-Vietnam period or, more specifically, to the period after the end of conscription. Second, the studies we examine in this recent period have focused attention on enlisted rather than officer personnel. The focus is justified substantively on the presumption that filling the enlisted ranks is a more difficult and challenging task in the all-volunteer recruiting environment. Consequently, our claims deal only with the effects of normative motivations of enlisted personnel serving in the post-Vietnam era of the all-volunteer force.

Fortunately, for our purposes, there have been a number

of studies done in this period which do consider both normative motives and economic incentives underlying decisions by young people to enlist. The most important of these studies are the Armed Forces Entrance and Examination Station (AFEES) questionaires periodically administered as part of the in-processing of a large number of recruits and the National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) survey of youth, begun in 1979 and carried on annually since, which will eventually supply the first longitudinal data available about youths serving in the military. These and other surveys drawn on in our study are described in Appendix A. We would prefer, of course, to have longitudinal data for use right now (we do not) and we would prefer to have interview data which provides a richer store of information than survey questions for which response categories have been fixed a priori. That we do not, limits the kind of inferences we can make. Nevertheless, the available evidence is impressive in its quality and, as we shall see, in the degree to which it converges to support our main contention that patriotic motivations play an important role in affecting enlistment and service in the armed forces.

The object of the rest of this chapter is to establish a theoretical framework for analyzing these data. In the next section, we provide a brief overview of contemporary thought about patriotism to afford a view of why this factor has been neglected or been thought to be irrelevant for discussion of military manpower planning in the 1970s. In section 3, we show that empirically, despite lacking much official encouragement, patriotism continues to be

considered an important justification for military service by those who serve. In the fourth section we offer a definition of patriotism to guide our analysis. We clarify its meaning by comparing it to alternative definitions and by exploring its implications for thinking about the social process of enlistment. Finally, in the fifth section, we summarize the plan of the work.

2. Neglect of Patriotism and Military Manpower Policy

The study of patriotism has been neglected by social science and by manpower analysts advising the military. Their neglect is easily documented. (1) It is less easily understood, especially during the period of the all-volunteer force. The historical record highlights the role of patriotic factors in explaining levels of recruitment into the armed forces. From the French Revolution through World War II, the repeated mobilizations of mass armies to fight "total" wars depended to an important extent on patriotic enthusiasm. (2) Social scientists are aware of these facts. Research done on the Wehrmacht in World War II told of the importance of attachment to symbols of nationhood for understanding levels of unit cohesion. (3) Such research might have provided the basis for further work about the role of attachment to symbols--or more specifically of patriotism and nationalism--in affecting rates of volunteering for and service in the military. (4) But it did not. The question is why? There are three

reasons which we think help answer the question: the organization of social science research, the negative and critical attitude held by many scholars toward patriotism which has discouraged research on the subject, and the adoption by social scientists and manpower analysts of a utilitarian outlook for explaining social behavior.

The first reason is important if we are to avoid attributing too much intentionality to the neglected study of patriotic factors. The point has recently been emphasized by Morris Janowitz. Addressing this issue, he reminds us that social scientists "do not operate with a carefully worked out research agenda," but rather "stumble from project to project" with the result that crucial data needed to study an issue are often lacking. (5) Since the end of World War II, social science research of the military has been increasing both in the number of studies done and in the range of topics covered. (6) Still there are limits to what is covered, not all of which are established by the scarcity of resources. So long as the research topics to be pursued are chosen freely as the result of the curiosity and interests of individual scholars or at the behest of various research sponsors, each of whom has his own curiosity and interests to satisfy, not every topic that might be studied will be studied. The range of topics covered will be a fragment of what it is possible to do. Studies done will be concentrated, unevenly, in different areas, at different times as dictated by fashions prevailing in each discipline and by the real opportunities for intellectual advance. If the study of patriotism has been neglected, it has been to

some extent an unintended consequence of the way research agendas are established and carried out.

Nonetheless, it is true that many scholars have reacted negatively toward patriotism and have been critical of what they thought it stood for. Their reaction, drawing its strength from two sources, is also partly responsible for neglect of the study of patrictism. One source of their negativism is the belief that patriotism entails an uncritical loyalty toward the natich-state and an unquestioning obedience to the commands of government. Such patriotism can lead to an unjustified aggrandisement of the power of the state. (7) Citizens whose loyalty is unbridled by any other, especially more proximate loyalties cannot act responsibly to check policies followed either by a vainly imperious or a well-meaning, but incompetent government. The enormous destruction of human lives during World War I remains the vital symbol of the problem. As local attachments are undermined, such failures of leadership are bound to recur not only in war, but in other spheres as national government assumes more and greater responsibilities until eventually it overreaches its grasp. There is a sense, articulated by Robert Nisbet, that this is the course we are on. According to this view, patriotism which was the lifeblood of the national political community is losing its vitality; dessicated, it is no longer important. (8)

The second source of negativism reacts rather to the impotence than to the overreaching power of the state. It is based on the belief that patriotism sustains parochial

identification and commitments to particular interests which are futile and counterproductive in the face of modern weaponry. The bleak prospects of nuclear war make mockery of substantive claims to national sovereignty. The loyalty of citizens tied too closely to the nation blocks identification with the "one world" of humankind which is needed to force governments to recognize their weakness and work seriously for effective disarmament. (9) Patriotism is an anachronism according to this view and an obstacle to peace. Aware of the role intellectuals played in cultivating intense nationalistic sentiments at the turn of the century (10), there is now among many an understandable reluctance to undertake research which might stir patriotic sentiments. The dangers of misunderstanding are real.

Both sources of negativism toward national patriotism sustain doubt about the capacity of national governments to rule authoritatively whether owing to the lack of competing local patriotisms or to the lack of a larger world-embracing attachment. Their doubt resonates with the cynical attitude toward political authority which characterizes the "advocacy" reporting of mass media journalists. (11) Nevertheless, the warrant for doubt can be exaggerated. The negativism is based on beliefs about patriotism which are in need of reconstruction (see section 4 below).

Finally, social scientists and manpower analysts have neglected to study patriotism because they have adopted a market-model approach to their study of social organization. The approach is not difficult to explain. The logic is utilitarian and rationalist. According to the market model,

individuals are abstracted from their social frame and supposed to be autonomous beings internally impelled to pursue (with varying degrees of avidity) the satisfaction of their wants. To do so, individuals enter into exchanges with one another or with the major institutions of society. They are free (and should be free) to calculate which among a set of alternative courses is the one most likely to help them achieve their aims. They should not be arbitrarily restrained from pursuing that course. (12) The extent to which this model has been adopted by researchers concerned with military recruitment is striking and undeniable. It underpins current research into levels of pay and the conditions of work as well as studies of youth attitudes toward the military. The primary purpose is "market research;" it is to determine what segments among the youth populaton are most attracted to the "product" which the military has to offer. Indeed, the market outlook has become so dominant as to achieve for some the status of dogma. As noted in a recent paper by John Faris, when confronted with data which dc not fit the model, these researchers are willing to throw them out, treating them as abberant rather than as evidence casting doubt on the model. (13)

Adoption of the market model was not foreordained especially in regard to military manpower policy. At the close of World War II, there was a strong presumption within the armed forces that military service was an obligation and that presumption was evidently widely shared by members of the civilian population through the 1960s. (14) The change

in outlook can be dated by acceptance of the Gates Commission report in 1970 which recommended establishing an all-volunteer force. Not the recommmendation per se, but the logic justifying it sustains the claim. Rather than obligation, military service was viewed as a job. Failure to pay wages comparable to those paid in the civilian sector, whether to draftees or to career service personnel, was to impose a burden, a special "tax" to be borne by those in the military, but not by others. Adopting a more equitable system of pay would enable the military to attract into its ranks a large enough number of qualified youths that the draft could be abolished. It would end the system of "hilden taxation", which low payed conscription had imposed on some, and distribute the costs of defense more fairly across the whole population. (15) The presumption of a military obligation, of course, was abandoned. And patriotic motivations to serve were largely beside the point. Not that the Gates Commission lacked regard for the patriotism of those serving. Rather, the commissioners believed that patriotic motivations varied independently of market-based economic incentives to join the military. They saw no reason to suppose that those who joined for higher pay or better working conditions would be less motivated to serve their country than those who joined at lower rates of pay. (16) Consequently they felt free to recommend a strategy for recruitment into an all-volunteer force which put primary emphasis on the market-linked factors of pay and conditions of work. Consideration of patriotism--or any other normative factor--was judged to be largely irrelevant

for the construction of military manpower policy. As it was put in one study prepared for the Gates Commission, "We . . . assume that, in principle, the individual can evaluate non-pecuniary costs and benefits in pecuniary terms." (17)

In sum, recent years have not been ones to encourage the study of patriotism as an important factor affecting levels of enlistment in the all-volunteer force. Negativism toward patriotism within the social sciences generally has not created a climate in which such studies could flourish. Adoption of an approach toward military manpower policy that emphasizes market incentives rather than political obligations has also helped to produce if not a conspiracy of silence, at least silence on this issue.

3. Persistence of Patriotic Motivation

Given greater emphasis on economic incentives and the lack of attention paid to patriotic motives by recruitment policy, it is surprising but important to note the extent to which enlisted personnel report that they volunteered for military service out of a desire to serve their country. Uniform trend data are not available for every service over the years following the end of conscription. What data are available, however, show that young people do regard patriotic motivation as an important factor influencing their decision to enlist.

The most dramatic evidence of this fact is available from random sample surveys of enlisted personnel done by the U.S.

Army for the years 1974 to 1981. The relevant data are summarized in Table 1-1. Not suprisingly, career soldiers are nearly unanimous in agreeing with the statement that "everyone should have to serve his or her country in some way." There are modest fluctuations from year to year in the exact percentage reported. These fluctuations should not distract one from perceiving the strong and enduring attitude favoring natonal service among enlisted personnel serving beyond the first term. Although their attitude was less homogenous, first-term servers share the careerists' orientation in favor of the idea of having to serve one's country. Particularly noteworthy is the sharp upswing in the percentage of those who agree that service is required, from its low of 59.4% in 1979 to its high or 78.1% in 1981. Perhaps more important, the gap in outlook separating first-term and career servers narrowed perceptibly after 1978.

These data reflect the process of self selection of miltary personnel from that segment of the American population most inclined to believe in the importance of national service. Not that these trend data support the hypothesis that the military have become more insulated from American society on this issue of serving one's country. Gallup poll data suggest a trend of opinion regarding the requirement of national service similar to what we observe for first-term servers. In 1973, 63% favor some form of national service for males, in 1977 the percentage is 62% and in 1979, 60%; but in 1981, 71% of those polled favor some form of national service. To be sure young people

Table 1-1. Percent in Army Who Strongly Agree or Agree that "Everyone Should Have to Serve His or Her Country in Some Way", 1974-1981 (enlisted personnel only)

Year	First Term	Career Servers
1981	78.1	89.7
1980	68.4	84.6
1979	65.6	80.1
1978	59.4	81.5
1977	64.9	83.9
1976	62.5	81.1
1975	64.2	82.5
1974	62.6	85.1

Source: Human Resources Development Directorate, Personnel Department, U.S. Army, Soldier Survey, 1974-1981

between the ages of 18 and 24 are far less likely than the population as a whole to favor any requirement of national service. Yet, in recent years, even young people have looked with increasing favor on some sort of required national service. While only 42% favored such a requirement in 1979, down from 50% in 1977 and 51% in 1973, 58% favored such a requirement in 1981. On the basis of these figures, increased support for national service among first term servers mirrors a similar trend within the civilian population. (18)

Differences in the level of agreement in favor of a requirement to serve one's country between young people in the civilian population and those serving in the military provide us with an indirect measure of the effects of patriotic motivation on enlistment rates. The assumption is that those who favor a requirement for national service are more likely than others to be self motivated to enlist out of a desire to serve their country.

More direct measures are available for enlisted personnel from APEES survey data collected in 1971, 1977, and 1979. In the 1971 survey respondents were asked whether a desire "to serve my country" was a "strong influence," "some influence," or "no influence" on the respondents' decision to enlist. Only 18.3% said it had "no influence" on their decision, while 42.2% said it was a "strong influence" and 39.5% said it was "some influence." Of the 11 other reasons for enlisting included in this survey only three reasons influenced a larger proportion of the sample. These data provide a benchmark by which to evaluate changes in the

post-Vietnam period. The data for 1977 confirm our hypothesis that the patriotic motive has persisted as an important factor affecting enlistments despite the end of conscription and the greater emphasis on market-based economic incentives. Presented with a much longer list of 26 reasons for enlisting, only 17.6% of the respondents in 1977 report that wanting "to serve my country" was "not important to enlistment," while 42.6% said it was "somewhat important" and 39.9% that it was "very important" to their enlistment. The survey for 1979 permits us to assess how important the desire to serve one's country is. On a list of 11 possible reasons for enlistment, "to serve my country" was chosen as the most important or second most important reason by over 20% of all respondents. (19)

In the NLS Survey for 1980, the respondents most comparable to repondents in the AFEES samples are those young people who have enlisted but are not yet serving in the armed forces. The level at which these respondents report enlisting "to serve one's country" (83.1%) is comparable with the levels reported in earlier years by recent recruits in the Army.

Overall, whether we look at general indicators of attitudes toward required national service or more personal explanations of why enlisted personnel enlist, there is a pattern of persistence and perhaps even an upswing in the importance of attributions to serving one's country. These findings are central to our analysis, for we shall argue, patriotism is the readiness to act in the service of one's country.

4. The Meaning of Patriotism

Patriotism is often defined as "love of one's country" but to do so seems to adopt a definition that lacks precise meaning. As Francis Coker wrote in his article on this subject for the Encyclopaedia of the Social Sciences "there is little agreement among equally intelligent and public spirited men as to what is meant by one's country, who one's fellow countrymen are, what services and sacrifices one owes them and what sort of social conduct follows naturally from the patriotic attitude." (20) Coker neglected to add how little agreement there is about what we mean by "love" when we refer to our attachments to a collectivity. No matter what definition we choose, we may not be able to escape this problem entirely.

The difficulty is that ordinarily we use "patriotism" as a term of evaluation rather than as a neutral term describing some easily verifiable fact about a person. Our use of it is unlike (say) our use of the word "gentleman" in its original meaning, which designated a man with a coat of arms and landed property, but is like our use of "gentleman" in its current meaning, designating someone who behaves well. "Loving one's country", like "behaving well," is a term of praise that carries no readily agreed upon meaning. Consequently, to say someone is a patriot reveals more about the attitude of the speaker than about the objective behavior of the person spoken about. (21) The difficulty is illustrated graphically when we recall the disapprobation early Americans accorded such British patriots as Thomas

Hutchinson, once governor of the Massachusetts colony, or Benedict Arnold. (22) Despite the difficulties, it is essential for social science research to establish the meaning of patriotism as much as possible in terms that allow us to use it as a neutral term describing something definite about the social pheomena we are trying to understand.

For our purposes then, patriotism is the readiness to act in the service of one's country. It is an attitude, an orientation to act in a particular way. It includes a cognitive or critical component of beliefs about the existence of a duty or obligation to serve one's country and about the way such duties and obligations can be discharged. (23) These beliefs are complex. They are not usually clearly articulated within the minds of most individuals. They operate within us nonetheless and, to an important extent, they are collectively shared. They define what it means substantively to serve one's country. The patriotic attitude however is not only a matter of beliefs. It also includes sentiment. Identification of oneself as a citizen among citizens within a political community and feelings of solicitude toward the well-being of that community are important aspects of the sentiment of patriotism. Not less important are the feelings of affinity one has for fellow members of society and of attachment to the territory which our country occupies and is called "home." (24) Each of these sentiments is capable of being bruised or excited. When they are, our readiness to act as patriots is aroused. Of course it is not ordinary that these sentiments are

excited. Most of the time, their strength is attenuated by the requirements and routines of daily life. Even so, they act as a restraint on us. They predispose us to act not only with regard for our self-interest, but with regard also for the consequences of our actions on others.

In sum, patriotism as we define the term is a complex attitude founded both on positive sentiments toward and particular beliefs about serving one's country. We can clarify our meaning by treating two questions. First, how does this definition differ from alternative conceptions? And second, how does this way of thinking about patriotism help us understand something about why youths volunteer for military service?

Alternative Conceptions

Much confusion about the meaning of patriotism and hostility toward it results from an overemphasis on the role of sentiment in forming the attitude. The consequence of doing so is to accentuate what is "irrational" and "unthinking" in the patriotic attitude. John Somerville recently excoriated the "old" patriotism based on the immemorial tradition of love of fatherland which is, he asserts, "closely associated with willingness to risk one's life on the field of battle in defense of one's fatherland and people." (25) His main argument is directed against this "proudly irrational" but traditional association between patriotism and war, for it rejects the use and the standards

of reason by ordinary citizens to evaluate questions of war. He cites in support of his point, the charge of the Light Brigade and the poem which glorified it, the toast by Stephen Decatur ("my country, right or wrong"), and popular support for President Kennedy's ultimatum that the Soviets remove their missiles from Cuba. His argument has many faults, but illustrates an important point. What Janowitz calls "old fashion" patriotism is "essentially a primordial attachment to a territorial society, a deeply felt almost primitive sentiment of belonging." Precisely because this image of patriotism connotes "an automatic, almost unthinking response" by citizens, it is "subject to intellectual, analytic, and moral criticism." (26) Yet if this image of patriotism is distorted or incomplete, then much of the criticism of it loses its force. It is our contention that Somerville's image of patriotism (and all others like it) is distorted and incomplete.

Insofar as the problem Somerville addresses is actually a problem, it has to do with "jingoism," and "chauvinism" and "xenophobia." But these are not to be confused with patriotism. They presume a comparative context of attitudes about one's country in contrast to attitudes toward other countries, and imply invidious distinctions or belligerent policies. Patriotic attitudes by themselves do not imply any particular valence of attitudes towards other groups or countries. To suggest that they do distorts the meaning of the term. More to the point, the patriotic attitude is not simply a matter of sentiment which, once aroused, carries people headlong to do whatever government bids them.

Sentiments make us ready to act. How we act, whether critically or uncritically, whether supporting the government or opposing its policies, is a complicated matter settled in large part by the content and strength of our beliefs about how to serve the country. Not surprisingly, we must examine the content of these beliefs if we want to understand how patriotism and military service are connected.

A Critical Component

If we ask what is the connection between patriotism and the motivation of youths to volunteer for military service, we will not be able to supply a single answer. What we can do is note the long tradition, not only in the history of the modern nation-state, but in social philosophy as well, which documents the belief that military service is customarily considered to be an obligaton of citizenship, a form of service to one's country. The presumption of social philosophy is of a "duty to fight for one's polity" and that "military service is therefore a part of civic education." (27) As just cited, the presumption is based on formulations by Rousseau, but similar formulations could be derived from Hobbes and Locke. (28) Even contemporary social philosophers recognize that "everyone has a natural duty to do his part in the existing scheme" of society, a part that may very well include doing military service, either voluntary or conscripted. (29) These beliefs are not

only the stuff of philosophers. They are supported by the experience of national histories, crystallized in battle monuments and memorial cemeteries as symbols of the nation associated with military achievements, and carried on by institutions like the national militia. (30) When they are internalized, these beliefs are able by themselves to stir the sentiments of patriotism within us, at least to a moderate degree. For this reason, we expect that youths who have been exposed to these beliefs and who assimilated them are more likely than other youths to join the military and that they will do so for patriotic reasons.

There are, of course, substantial and important differences of opinion about the rationale which justifies the presumption that military service is a duty and a service to one's country. What exactly these are need not detain us here. That they exist at all is important, for it shows that our beliefs about how and when to serve our country are not derived from fixed principles. The beliefs we hold are inherited in large part from the past, but they are modified in our hands to adjust to changing circumstances. Differences of opinion in the debate over changing beliefs make it impossible to specify, much less to justify, a single set of circumstances under which every military response could be called a service to one's country. But there is no requirement for unanimity either. The lack of complete consensus promises restraint. The point is illustrated by the recent crisis in Iran. When hostages were taken, sentiments crucial to the patictic attitude were bruised. There was an outburst of patriotic

display and the possibility of defensive reaction was real. Yet, on balance, our beliefs about how to serve our country did not include taking military action precipitously on the impulse of bruised national sentiments.

In sum, the patriotic attitude is a readiness to act in the service of one's country. It is not simply a sentiment which predisposes us "automatically" or without thought to support, militarily if need be, any political policy. It is a balance of sentiments, which arouse our readiness to act, and of beliefs not wholly our own, but collectivly shared, which justify what actions count as service to the country. The role of beliefs is critical, but usually overlocked. They may either encourage or restrain the impulse of sentiment. In either case, they supply the standard or norms for evaluating our action. How these beliefs are formed is an important question, but too far afield for us to consider now. We hypothesize that they are the outcome of an ongoing process of civic education which begins early in youth and continues throughout the life-cycle. The focal issues, of course, are whether, as one outcome of this process, young people join the military for patrictic reasons, and if so, to determine what impact the patriotic motive has on their subsequent military service. These are the particular questions with which, as noted at the outset, this report is concerned.

5. Plan of the Work

To study these issues, we divided our research into three parts. The first part, reported in chapter 2, considers in detail the relative importance of economic incentives and normative motives in accounting for the reasons young people join the military. If normative reasons are of small importance--a finding which we can doubt because of evidence already reported (section 3 above) on the persistence of patriotism--then there is little need to inquire further into the role of patriotic motives. Our analysis of the data leads us to conclude that normative motives in general and patriotic motives in particular are important factors influencing the enlistment decision and are wrongly overlooked by current military manpower studies.

The second part of our study, reported in chapter 3, considers the processes of early socialization and their impact on forming patriotic attitudes and so, indirectly, on the decision to enlist. The emphasis here is on the social process by which patriotic sentiments and beliefs are acquired. Confined to survey data, we are limited in what we can infer. Our analysis leads us to conclude that socialization experiences within the family are very important factors affecting formation of patriotic attitudes, but that these do not vary systematically, as one might expect, with class-based or ethnic cleavages in society.

The third part of our study, reported in chapter 4, considers the impact of patriotic motives in the military.

The issue here concerns the relationship between personality factors and conditions of work in role performance within the military. Here we are limited by having only cross-sectional data when longitudinal data are wanted and by a lack of role-specific performance measures. Our analysis allows us to posit some hypotheses as benchmarks for future research. We argue that patriotically motivated enlisted personnel better assimilate the military role and so are "higher" quality recruits than those who enlisted for other reasons. Nonetheless, it appears that, under certain conditions, patriotic motivations might be eroded during the course of enlisted service.

The report concludes, in chapter 5, with an overview of the findings and a brief assessment of the limits of patriotic motivations in the contemporary setting. Our emphasis here is on the impact of mass advertising and market-linked recruiting policies.

Notes

1. The neglect is comparatively easy to document especially for civilian scholarship. A search of the card catalogs of of major research libraries and of the Social Science Index and Humanities Index turns up few entries under the heading "patriotism," far fewer than are found under such related subjects as "nationalism." In part, the limited number of entries is an artifact of library classificaton systems based on "keywords" in titles and abstracts, but only in part. Military manpower analysts are not much more concerned than civilian scholars with assessing the import of patriotic factors. See a review of this literature by D. Edwin Lebby and associates, Military Option Evaluation Study, 4 vols., (Radnor,Pa.: Chilton Research Services), Appendix P.

2. Michael Howard, War in European History, (Oxford: Oxford

University Press, 1976), pp. 75-115.

3. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Center and Periphery, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 345-383.

4. Morris Janowitz, "Patriotism and the U.S. All-Volunteer Military," Air University Review (January/February 1982): pp. 31-39.

5. Ibid., p.33.

6. Morris Janowitz, "Consequences of Social Science Research on the U.S. Military." Armed Forces and Society, 8 (Summer 1982): pp. 507-524.

7. Robert Nisbet, Twilight of Authority, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1975), pp. 64-70.

8. Ibid. For an earlier formulation of the argument see G.K. Chesterton, "The Patriotic Idea," England: A Nation, (London: R. Brimley Johnson, 1904), pp. 1-43, esp. pp. 40-43.

9. The range of intellectuals endorsing this or some similar position is vast. As a sample, see Sigmund Freud, "Why War?" Character and Culture, (New York: Collier Books, 1963), pp. 134-147; C. Wright Mills, The Causes of World War Three, (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1958); and Edmund Wilson, Patriotic Gore, (New York: Oxford University Press, 1962), pp. xxv-xxxii.

10. See Harold D. Lasswell, Propaganda Technique in World War I, (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 1971), pp. 47-76; Julian Benda, The Treason of Intellectuals, (New York: Norton, 1956); and Barnett Singer, "From Patriots to Pacificists: The French Primary School Teachers, 1880-1940," Journal of Contemporary History, 12 (1977): 413-434.

11. Morris Janowitz, The Last Half Century, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1978), pp. 343-346, 354-363.

12. See Chapter II below.

13. John H. Faris. Economic and Non-Economic Factors in the Recruitment and Retention of Personnel to the All-Volunteer Force. Unpublished paper, Towson State University, 1982.

14. Russell F. Weigley, Towards an American Army, (New York: Columbia University Press, 1962), pp. 243-249.

15. President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, (Washington, D. C.: G. P. O., 1970), pp. 23-33.

16. Ibid., chap. 12.

17. Alan Fechter, "Impact of Pay and Draft Policy on Army Enlistment Behavior," Studies Prepared for the President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force, (Washington, D. C.: G. P. O., 1970), quoted in Choongsoo Kim et al., The All-Volunteer Force: An Analysis of Youth Participation, Attrition and Reenlistment, (Center for Human Rescurce Research, Ohio State University), p. 24.

18. George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion 1972-1977, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1978), pp. 21-22, 212-213, 952-953; George H. Gallup, The Gallup Poll, Public Opinion, 1979, (Wilmington, Del.: Scholarly Resources, 1980), pp. 153-154; Chicago Sun-Times, 5 July 1981, p. 18.

19. There were two forms to the survey. In one form the percentage was 20.4, in the other it was 22.8.

20. Francis W. Coker, "Patrictism," Encyclaepedia of the Social Sciences, (New York: Macmillan, 1934), s. v.

21. The example is borrowed from C. S. Lewis, Mere Christianity, (Glasgow: Collins, 1977), pp. 9-10.

22. Bernard Bailyn, The Ordeal of Thomas Hutchipson, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1974).

23. "Duty" and "obligation" are technical terms in social philosophy. The distinction is preserved, but does not require extended discussion here.

24. Virgil C. Aldrich, "The Philosophy of American Patriotism," Western Humanities Review, XXXI (Winter, 1977): 1-16.

25. John Somerville, "Patriotism and War," Ethics, (July, 1981): 568-578.

26. Morris Janowitz, "Patriotism and the All-Volunteer Military," op cit., p. 34.

27. Judith N. Shklar, Men and Citizens, (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1969), p. 189.

28. See C. B. Macpherson, The Political Theory of Possessive Individualism, Hobbes to Locke, (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1962).

29. John Rawls, A Theory of Justice, (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1970), pp. 114, 377-382.

30. T. H. Marshall, Class, Citizenship, and Social Development, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1977), chap. 4; Morris Janowitz, "Observations on the Sociolcgy of Citizenship," Social Forces, 59 (September, 1980), pp. 13-16.

CHAPTER II

REASONS FOR ENLISTING IN THE ALL-VOLUNTEER FORCE

On 4 October 1982, the Army Times carried a report about research done by economists at the Army Research Institute on how economic recovery might effect present high levels of enlistment into the military. They found the link between unemployment and enlistment to be so strong that, should jobless rates decline as predicted, the military will have to raise pay and increase educational benefits to avoid a substantial short fall in accessions. (1) The report is not unique. The study is only one further illustration of the pervasive influence of economic, or market-oriented, models on the thinking of military manpower analysts since the end of the 1960s. (2) Nowadays, many (perhaps most) analysts and manpower planners conventionally attribute the motivation of youth to volunteer for military service to economic or instrumental incentives. But, the convention need not be accepted unquestioningly.

This chapter questions the wisdom of concentrating attention on economic incentives to the exclusion of other kinds of motives for enlisting. The economic approach is defective in several ways (described in section 1) and of limited utility for increasing our knowledge of normative and other noneconomic reasons for joining the armed forces. Grounding our analysis on data drawn from the NLS and APEES

surveys, we argue (in section 2) that normative and noneconomic motives are as important to explaining enlistment decisions as are economic incentives. They may be more so. Multidimensional analysis of a variety of reasons for enlisting suggest, as we shall show (in section 3), that the patriotic motive of joining to serve one's country is relatively more important than any other single reason affecting enlistment decisions.

1. The Limited Utility of Economic Explanations

The economic approach to studying issues of military manpower is characterized, in broad terms, by three related assumptions. One is that cost-benefit analysis supplies a comprehensive paradigm for understanding social behavior, especially decision-making. It is based on the postulate that people act as "utility-maximizers". A second is that individual decisions can be altered, at least in aggregate, by manipulating the external structure of rewards. Normative factors, operating within individuals, are not subject to manipulation by policy-makers and so are treated as if they are unimportant. The third assumption is that all individual preferences, to act one way rather than another, can be reduced either to economic factors or factors amenable to economic analysis. When applied to problems of manpower planning and to evaluations of reasons for enlisting, these assumptions lead us to partial and misleading conclusions. Let us consider one example for

each assumption.

Cost-benefit analysis has been applied by Martin Binkin and Mark Eitelberg to a summary discussion of the controversy surrounding social representativeness in the armed forces. (3) The critical value, they assume, is to achieve the greatest social equity. How to do so depends on whether we are at war. During times of war, social inequity is minimized when the burdens (or costs) of military service, the risks of death and injury, are equally distributed across all social classes. Accomplishing this usually requires a system of mandatory service based on conscription. In other times, social equity is maximized when the benefits of military service (education, jobs and job training, etc.) are freely available to the disadvantaged and minorities in society. A voluntary system of recruitment, emphasizing self-selection, helps to achieve this goal. The assumption is that people decide to enlist on the basis of self-interest. The problem, as Binkin and Eitelberg point out, is how to adjust institutional mechanisms of recruitment for maximum social equity. The difficulty is brought into sharp focus when considering the period of transition from peace to war in which a disproportionate risk to life and limb is borne by the least advantaged segments of society.

Note that the problem cannot be further resolved within the framework of cost-benefit analysis. There are and can be no mitigating factors. There cannot be so long as as we view military service as either a cost or benefit for those who serve. An alternative view was suggested in the last

chapter. People join the armed forces because they believe that doing so is to perform a service for one's country. So long as patriotic beliefs cut across class lines and lines of ethnic division, which they do (see Chapters III and IV), then "representativeness" is not simply an index of social cleavage. In the current setting of an all-volunteer force, it is also an index of the extent to which patriotic beliefs motivate youths to enlist and affect present tendancies toward a socially unrepresentative enlisted force. The issues raised are complicated and treated more fully in Chapter IV. For now, it is sufficient to grasp that cost-benefit analysis would not have led Binkin and Eitelberg to consider the independent effects of normative factors on this important question affecting recruiting policies.

A similar exclusion of normative factors results when emphasis is placed on factors which policy makers can manipulate. We can see this by turning to the Military Option Evaluation Study done by Chilton Research Associates in 1980. (4) The study identified three "prime" lifestyle segments in the youth population containing youths most positively oriented to the military. And it studied the changing reaction of youths to systematic manipulation of various conditions of work to gauge their relative importance. The aim was to devise a way of measuring the impact of changing conditions of work on the propensity to enlist. Of particular interest here is one of the three lifestyle segments called the group of "potential leaders". Members of this group were highly qualified for military

service, being well-educated and high achievers. They were also more likely than members of other segments to regard "wanting to help my country" as the most important reason affecting the decision to enlist (19.5% said so). When reviewing the relevant market strategy for attracting members of this group into the service, the Chilton researchers did not ignore this interesting finding. They write that one "most significant consideration in regard to this group is the potential for traditional service oriented (patriotic) motivational efforts to enhance accessions." (5) Tied to an analysis of the external conditions of work, which are subject to policy manipulation, they did not follow up on this insight. The very next sentence in their text lists earning money for college and other educational benefits, career opportunites, and interim job training (all economic factors) as the points to emphasize when "selling" the military service to the Potential Leader group.

Overlooking evidence that normative factors may play an important part in affecting enlistment decisions is conditioned by the assumption that all individual preferences to enlist can be reduced, in the last analysis, to economic factors. A particularly obvious example of this has recently been reported by John Faris. (6) He tells of an analysis of reenlistment performed by RAND economists. As part of their work, they discovered a positive relationship between reenlistment and an estimate of civilian earnings if the respondent were to leave the military. Those who would expect higher civilian salaries were in fact more likely to reenlist. The economists,

however, could not accept the finding. Rather than treat it seriously as something to be explored, they blamed the quality of the survey responses for supplying evidence inconsistent with the "common sense" of economic logic. The assumption that economic factors are the most important ones to look into is not persuasively established on such grounds.

These deficiencies in the economic approach make it difficult to use when trying to assess the relative importance of a variety of reasons for joining the military. This is not to say that economic factors are unimportant to enlistment decisions. Undoubtedly, they are important. The measure of their importance, however, can only be taken when we consider their impact side by side with the impact of normative and other noneconomic motives. That the undertaking would be worthwhile is indicated in a preliminary fashion by data gathered in the 1979 AFEES survey. When offered the (hypothetical) alternative of a civilian job paying $700 a month, fewer than 1 in 3 (29.9%, n=5331) who gave "service to country" as one reason for enlisting said they would have taken the civilian job. In contrast, nearly 1 in 2 (48.0%, n=946) of those who did not include "service to country" as a reason for enlisting said they would have taken the civilian job.

2. Normative and Economic Reasons for Enlisting

In this section we compare normative and economic reasons for enlisting. We do this on the basis of data contained in the 1980 NLS Youth and 1979 AFEES surveys. Both surveys asked respondents to tell which of twelve reasons described why they joined the military.

Before making any comparison, we must first classify the various response alternatives given to the question so as to distinguish economic from noneconomic motivations. The task is less easy than it may at first appear. The classification scheme cannot be unidimensional. Economic incentives, for example, are often means to ends which themselves have a strong normative component. "Earning money for college" is an economic incentive of this type as is "training for a job." And so too may be such "crudely" economic reasons as "earning better income." Much depends on whether the respondent wants the income for himself or for his widowed mother. Similarly, normative motives are end-oriented, but do not specify the means by which the ends should be achieved. They may in fact be responsive to economic incentives. "To better oneself" may entail taking advantage of the economic mobility or job training opportunities which military service promises for some. Other reasons are not obviously either economically rational or normatively oriented. They are instead inclined toward satisfying what W. I. Thomas called the desire for "new experience." (7) In this category, we put such reasons as "escaping a personal problem," "travel," and "proving

oneself." Even here it must be said that there is room for a variety of economic or normative factors to enter in as secondary interpretations. The "deep structure" of meaning which respondents attribute to these response categories can only be treated satisfactorily through open-ended interviews. Nonetheless, we attempt a classification of reasons which is presented in Table 2-1.

The typology is based on two factors. The first factor deals with whose interests are being gratified and when. Three classes are distinguished: (1) immediate gratification of our interests, (2) deferred gratification of our interests for self and for others, and (3) gratification of our interests for others. The second factor reiterates the primary orientation of the reason to act which was given above, namely, our desire for new experience, for economic gains, or for normative compliance. Each of the twelve reasons is assigned a value in terms of both factors. The "desire to serve one's country", for example, is classed as oriented toward normative compliance in gratification of our interests for others.

No attempt is made to force absolutely consistent cross-classifications. All reasons oriented to new experience are also considered an attempt to seek immediate gratification of self-interest. But some reasons oriented to economic gain are considered as an attempt to obtain immediate gratification of self-interest, while others are classed as an attempt to seek deferred gratification of our self-interests and interests for others. The typology is offered as a heuristic device. Its value is in its ability

Table 2-1. Classification and Primary Orientation of Reasons for Enlisting

Classification of Reasons	Primary Orientation of Reason
Immediate Gratification of Self-Interest	
Prove oneself	new experience
Travel	new experience
Be on one's own	new experience
Escape personal problem	new experience
Earn better income	economic
Unemployed	economic
Deferred Gratification of Interest for Self and Others	
Train for civilian job	economic
Earn money for college	economic
Obtain retirement/ fringe benefits	economic
Better oneself	normative
Family tradition	normative
Gratification of Interest for Others	
Desire to serve country	normative

to clarify our comparison of economic and noneconomic reasons for enlisting.

Data from the NLS survey, reported in Table 2-2, show that neither economic or normative motives are unambiguous choices as the main reason people join the armed forces. Just 5.7% of youths serving in the military say that they joined primarily from a "desire to serve one's country." This normative reason was ranked seventh on a list of twelve posssible reasons for enlisting. Far below it, ranked eleven, was "family tradition," although above it, ranked third, was the other normatively oriented reason, "to better oneself." The pattern is similar for economic incentives. "Training for a civilian job" or "earning money for college expenses" ranked first and second respectively. Yet this is not to say that economic incentives are certainly favored over normative reasons. Only 6.7%, 1% more than are patriotically motivated and 6.1% less than are motivated to better themselves, said they enlisted because they were unemployed. Far fewer joined to earn retirement or fringe benefits or because they could receive a better income as soldiers than as civilians. Reasons for joining in the immediate gratification of the desire for new experiences were clustered, but in the middle ranks. They cannot be said to dominate the list either.

The ambiguity of these results is not entirely unexpected. The decision to enlist is complex. Having to commit oneself for a term of four years and to leave one's local community to be in the military dramatizes the seriousness of this occupational choice compared to

Table 2-2. Main Reason for Enlisting in the Military (in percent)

Reason	Given By Current Servers
To train for civilian job	25.1
To earn money for college	18.8
To better oneself	12.8
Travel	12.1
To be on one's own	9.8
Unemployed	6.7
Desire to serve one's country	5.7
To 'prove' oneself	4.3
To escape personal problem	1.8
For retirement/fringe benefits	1.3
Family tradition	0.7
Earn better income than as civilian	0.6
Base	780,980

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980

Table 2-3. Reasons for Enlisting in the Military (in percent)

Reasons	Current Servers	Enlistees Not Yet Serving
To better self	73.4	81.6
Travel	72.7	71.6
To train for civilian job	71.6	79.8
Desire to serve country	70.7	83.1
To be on one's own	61.7	50.9
To earn money for college	60.6	59.2
To prove one's self	47.8	49.3
For retirement/fringe benefits	33.8	54.8
Unemployed	19.3	27.5
Family tradition	17.7	12.2
Better income than as a civilian	13.1	34.7
Escape a personal problem	12.8	14.6
Base	(812,090)	(194,264)

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980

alternatives within the civilian sector. Opportunities for early separation, without the stigma of a less than honorable discharge do not alter this basic fact. It is reasonable to expect that a variety of motives simultaneously influence the outcome of any such decision.

Table 2-3 shows the relative importance of the same twelve reasons for enlisting, but this time the respondents were free to choose as many reasons as they felt applied. Note that the table supplies the responses of those who enlisted in 1980, but were not yet serving, as well as the responses of those currently serving. Two things stand out about this table. First, the patriotic motive is chosen by a much larger percentage of the youth population than in Table 2-2. While ranked only fourth among current servers, a desire to serve one's country was one reason for enlisting given by 70.7% of the current servers. That percentage is only 2.7% less than the top ranked and also normative reason, "to better oneself." Among the enlistees who were not yet serving, "desire to serve one's country" was the top ranked reason chosen by 83.1% of the entering group. Ranked second was the normative reason, "to better oneself." Nonnormative reasons do not approximate such high percentages.

Second, the economic incentives which ranked so high in Table 2-2 are ranked lower in Table 2-3. "To train for a civilian job" continues to be an important incentive chosen by 71.6% of the current servers. "To earn money for college expenses" is ranked sixth, chosen by 60.6% of the current servers, with retirement and fringe benefits, ranked lower

still. Notice that economic incentives which involve immediate gratification of self-interest are ranked below the others. In place of the more explicitly economic incentives toward the top of the list we find, beside the normative reasons having to do with the desire for new experience: "to travel," "to be on one's own," and "to 'prove' oneself." Only the desire to "escape a personal problem" is ranked very low. In short, economic incentives appear to be relatively less important than normative and noneconomic motives for enlisting in the armed forces.

This conclusion is depicted graphically when we examine the pattern of zero-order correlations between the twelve reasons for enlisting. Table 2-4 contains the zero-order correlations among the reasons using unweighted responses as is conventional for such analyses. Only the first seven reasons are highly intercorrelated with values of 0.30 or above. Even when the standard is lowered to a value of 0.20, the basic structure of the table remains the same. These seven reasons are highly intercorrelated. The remaining five are relatively peripheral. For our purposes, what is important is that only two of the seven related reasons have an explicit economic component, "to train for a civilian job" and "to earn money for college." Both of these entail deferred rather than immediate gratification of interests. This unweighted analysis suggests that noneconomic motives operate in different ways and somewhat independently of economic incentives. Replicating the analysis with weighted data leads one to the same conclusion. Of course, there is overlap between groups of

Table 2-4. Zero-Order Correlations Among Reasons for Enlisting

Reason	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12
TRAVEL	---											
JOB TRAINING	.41	---										
BETTER SELF	.47	.46	---									
BE ON OWN	.54	.38	.43	---								
SERVE COUNTRY	.47	.33	.48	.39	---							
COLLEGE EXP	.44	.37	.41	.33	.36	---						
PROVE SELF	.34	.31	.39	.36	.35	.30	---					
BENEFITS	.26	.20	.30	.24	.28	.36	.23	---				
UNEMPLOYED	.15	.20	.09	.17	.12	.10	.16	.11	---			
ESCAPE PROB	.12	.10	.15	.19	.05	.09	.21	.10	.12	---		
FAMILY TRAD	.12	.05	.19	.12	.24	.13	.23	.16	.11	.09	---	
BETTER INCOME	.15	.16	.16	.14	.05	.09	.14	.17	.18	.09	.04	---

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

economic and noneconomic reasons for enlisting. That fact only emphasizes what is the main point, that economic and normative factors operate jointly in a complex pattern to affect people's decisions to enter the armed forces.

In sum, normative motives, tc include patriotism, are at least as important as economic incentives for understanding why people volunteer for military service. In the NLS data set, they are cited as much or more often than most economic reasons are. The pattern of zero-order correlations supplements these findings. It suggests that normative and noneconomic motivations may be more important to youths than economic incentives are. They may be because their comparatively high level of intercorrelation gives them a cumulative and mutually reenforcing impact which economic incentives evidently lack. The suggestion leads us to inquire further into the relative importance of noneconomic motives for enlistment decisions.

3. The Relative Importance of the Patriotic Motive

Of all the reasons we have examined, the patriotic one is the least subject to multiple interpretations and the most obviously normative. Also, it is highly ranked as a reason for enlisting given by many respondents tc the NLS survey. Consequently, a closer examination of its impact on enlistment decisions by youths supplies a critical test of the relative importance of normative motives generally. There are two questions to be addressed by such an

examination. First, to what extent does the patriotic motive distinguish youths who enlist from youths who do not? And, second, how central is the patriotic reason as one motive among many for the youths who enlist?

Answering the first question requires that we find some measure of the patriotic motive in a broad sample of youths in the civilian population. For this purpose, we can draw on the April, 1982 Youth Attitude Tracking Survey (YATS). The survey was directed to a sample of civilian youths of military age and thus includes youths who did not intend and in fact did not enlist in the military.

Respondents were asked to indicate the likelihood of their enlisting in the military. On the basis of their reponses the sample was divided into a positive propensity group and a negative propensity group. On a separate item, respondents were asked to indicate how important a series of military job characteristics were to them. Table 2-5 shows the differences in relative importance placed on each dimension by positive and negative propensity groups, with larger values indicating a greater difference in the importance placed on a dimension by the positive propensity group. Only factors which discriminate positive from negative propensity respondents to a significant degree are included in the table. Apart from providing money for education and teaching valuable skills, no economic factors are listed. In contrast, the patriotic motive to do something for your country, was the characteristic which most clearly distinguished the positive propensity from the negative propensity group. On this evidence, we conclude

Table 2-5. Factors Discriminating Group Propensities Toward Enlistment

Job Characteristic	Group Propensity Positive	Negative	Difference
Doing something for your country	2.96	2.50	.46
Provides men and women equal pay/opportunity	2.90	2.66	.24
Trains you for leadership	2.81	2.58	.23
Provides money for Education	2.99	2.79	.20
Offers excitement and adventure	2.74	2.55	.19
Teaches valuable trade/ skill	3.31	3.16	.15
Opportunity to mature	3.06	2.97	.09
Opportunity for good family life	3.16	3.08	.08
N=	(1,585)	(3,539)	

Note: Scale varies from 1-4, the higher values indicating that the respondent believes that the job characteristic is important.

Source: Youth Attitude Tracking Study, 1982, p.84.

that the patriotic motive is a very important factor in distinguishing among youths who will enlist and those who will not.

Still, we need to ask how central is the patriotic motive to those who do enlist? It may be of some importance for many, but can we assess how important it is compared to other factors?

To address this second question, we undertook a multidimensional cluster analysis of all reasons for enlisting given by current servers included in the NLS survey sample. As with the correlation analysis, unweighted data were used. The cluster algorithm (described briefly in Appendix B) is readily available. It is specially designed for disjoint clustering of very large data sets. The aim of our analysis was to compare the responses of all subjects to the question which allowed them to pick as many of the twelve reasons as they wanted to describe why they enlisted. A cluster then contains a set of respondents whose responses to this question are quite similar to one another's and dissimilar to the responses given by members of other clusters. If the patriotic motive was relatively important in conditioning the enlistment decision, then it will be indicated by its dominant place characterizing the response of at least one cluster.

Table 2-6 presents the results of the 3-cluster solution. (8). The table reports the percentage of respondents, by cluster, who chose a particular reason for enlisting. The range of variation between clusters is indicated by the difference column in which the difference between the high

Table 2-6. Response Patterns of Three-Cluster Solution (in percent)

Reasons	Cluster (1) Normative Service to Country	Cluster (2) Economic market-linked	Cluster (3) Seeking new Experience	Difference
Immediate Gratification of Self-Interest				
Prove oneself	22.8	65.1	76.3	53.5
Travel	60.3	89.0	91.2	30.9
Be on one' own	47.1	85.8	92.1	45.0
Escape personal problem	4.6	27.2	9.0	22.6
Earn better income	10.0	12.5	34.5	24.5
Unemployed	7.9	31.2	7.0	24.2
Deferred Gratification of Interest for Self and Others				
Train for civilian job	73.2	80.8	35.1	45.7
Earn money for college	46.6	83.3	36.8	46.5
Obtain retirement/ fringe benefits	28.4	39.2	3.9	35.3
Better oneself	77.2	60.9	80.7	19.8
Family tradition	11.3	11.5	41.2	29.9
Gratification of Interest for Others				
Desire to serve country	72.8	56.6	57.5	16.2
N=	(478)	(401)	(140)	

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

and the low cluster percentages is reported. The least variation (at 16.2%) is reported for the patriotic motive. That is consistent with our YATS findings. For if the patriotic motive most effectively discriminates those who enlist from those who do not, then it is reasonable to expect a high degree of consensus about this reason for enlisting across clusters. Also note the different sizes of the clusters. The most typical response pattern is found in cluster 1, the largest cluster (n=478); it is followed closely by cluster 2 (with an n=401). Trailing far behind in typicality is the response pattern associated with cluster 3 (n=114).

Substantive understanding, of course, requires that we carefully examine the different response patterns to see what characterizes each and distinguishes it from the others. There are no statistical techniques to aid in this task. We chose the simple expedient of calling a reason characteristic of a cluster if the percentage of its members who chose the reason was greater than the percentage of members in other clusters who chose the reason. The criterion is a measure of relative importance. According to it, for example, "proving oneself" is relatively more important for members of cluster 3, 76.3% of whom chose it, than it is for members of clusters 1 or 2, whose members chose it as a reason for enlisting at a rate of only 22.8% and 65.1% respectively.

Analyzing each row in similar fashion we find that cluster 3 is dominated by those seeking new experience. Members of this cluster choose reasons of this type, as

defined in Table 2-1, more frequently than members of cluster 2 and much more often than members of cluster 1. Cluster 2 is dominated by those motivated by economic or market linked factors. They chose all but one economic incentive more often then did members of cluster 1 or 3. Members of this cluster were least likely to choose normative reasons for enlisting.

Cluster 1, the major cluster, is dominated by those who desire to serve their country. No other reason is characteristic of the response pattern of this cluster. The patriotic motive is of singular importance. Consistent with this interpretation are the very low proportion of respondents who chose reasons having to do with the immediate gratification of self-interest. The only other reasons which attract a high rate of response are the normative one to better oneself and the economic incentive to train for a civilian job, an incentive that easily bears a normative interpretation.

In sum, the cluster analysis provides ample evidence in favor of the proposition that normative motives are important relative to nonnormative motives and that the patriotic motive is of central importance in affecting the decisions to enlist by youths.

We began our analysis challenging the utility of an economic explanation of enlistment decisions. Our central criticism was that the economic approach paid insufficient attention to the importance of normative and noneconomic motives. We documented the importance of these actives to youths who have enlisted and are serving in the miliary.

And then we showed that among normative factors, the patriotic motive is of singular importance. Of many factors, including economic ones, it best distinguishes civilian youths who are likely to enlist from those who are not. It is of central importance in the self reports of reasons for enlisting given by the largest proportion of youths currently serving and included in the NLS survey.

Still, the significance of these findings has to be demonstrated. We must ask what difference it makes that youths serve for patriotic reasons. Before doing so, however, we will look briefly at the social factors which seem to be associated with transmission of the patriotic motive among youth.

Notes

1. Tom Philpott, "Formula Links Economy, Recruiting", Army Times 4 October. 1982, pp. 35, 50.

2.See Richard V.L. Cooper, Military Manpower and the All-Volunteer Force, (Santa Monica, Calif.: Rand Corporation R-1450-ARPA,1977); Richard V.L. Cooper, Defense Manpower Policy (Santa Monica, Calif.; Rand Corporation R-2396-ARPA, 1978); D. Edwin Lebby et. al., Military Option Evaluation Study, (Radnor, Pa.: Chilton Research Services, 1980); Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982),982), pp. 62-83.

3. Martin Binkin and Mark Eitelterg, op cit., (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 62-83.

4. D. Edwin Lebby and Associates, op cit.

5. Ibid., p. 204.

6. John H. Faris, Economic and Non-Economic Factors in the Recruitment and Retention of Personnel in the All-Volunteer Force, Unpublished paper, Towson State University, 1982.

7. W.I. Thomas, On Social Organization and Social Personality, ed. Morris Janowitz, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1966), pp. 119-123.

8. Less parsimonious solutions led to essentially similar conclusions and so are not reported here.

CHAPTER III

THE SHAPING AND TRANSMISSION OF PATRIOTIC MOTIVATIONS

The patriotic attitude is learned. It is not inborn. Nor is it an invariant attribute of youths the operation of which can be taken for granted. It is a long-term social product, the result of micro-socialization, through contact with family and friends, and also of macrosocialization, based on immersion in the country's political-cultural traditions and on attachment to the symbols of national authority and achievement. Its strength as a motive for enlistment derives, at least in part, from its capacity to articulate primary group attachments with attachments to the nation-state. (1)

The purpose of this chapter is to describe, as fully as possible, the social processes through which the patriotic motive is formed and transmitted. The evidence we have is partial and indirect for it is based on large-scale social survey data gathered at a point in time rather than on open-ended interviews conducted over a period of time. Nonetheless, we are able to show first (in section 1) that patriotic motives are not distributed systematically by the social structural positions on which fundamental societal divisions are often based. That leads us to argue (in section 2) that the most important mechanism for conveying patriotic attitudes is the interpersonal influence exerted

by family and friends. Finally, we argue (in section 3) that the substance of primary group influence is conditioned by such macrosocial factors as political leadership and the mass media which shape our understanding and appreciation of beliefs about the rightness of serving one's country through military service.

1. Distribution of the Patriotic Motive to Enlist

Military recruiting efforts are based, we have noted many times now, primarily on the appeal of a variety of market mechanisms communicated through advertising and the activities of recruiters. The focus has been on the response of prospective recruits in target markets segmented by structural characteristics such as race, employment status, social class, and educational attainment. Such an approach clearly has some degree of application and utility, particularly for a sub-group of recruits, estimated to compose from 10 to 20 percent of total accessions, who are enlisted "at the margin" and for whom such mechanisms are the decisive factors. Yet, our analysis strongly suggests, that the market approach is the least relevant for the largest proportion of recruits to the military, namely, those who enlist for patriotic reasons. As we saw in the last chapter, the impact of the patriotic motive on enlistment decisions is relatively independent of market-based appeals. Restricting attention to target markets, moreover, may lead recruiting programs to overlook

many who are able and enclined to enlist. It may, we argue now, because distribution of the patriotic motive is not highly correlated with the social structural position of those who join. Analysis of the distribution of patriotic motivations for joining the military across a set of social structural characteristics provides clear-cut support for this argument.

Table 3-1 shows that the frequency of reporting patriotic motivation for enlisting in the military is not importantly different for different levels of educational attainment. Recruits who have completed high school mentioned service to country as a reason for enlistment only slightly more frequently (64.7% vs. 61.7%) than those who did not complete high school. Nor are there important differences in frequency of reporting patriotic motivations for enlisting by ethnicity and race, urban vs. rural residence, or father's occupation. Southerners are more likely than others to cite patriotic motivation as a reason for enlisting, as are those raised on farms (though this is, of course, a small minority). But, overall, the frequencies of reporting patriotic reasons for enlisting are by no means greatly differentiated by these factors. These findings indicate that the patriotic attitude toward military service which is so important in producing recruits, particularly preferred recruits, is not differentially distributed in any systematic or significant fashion among various social structural categories or "market segments." More broadly, attachment to the nation is not based, in any significant degree, on the position one occupies in society.

Table 3-1. Percent Reporting Patrictic Motivation By Selected Social Background Characteristics

Social Background Characteristic	%	Base
Educational Attainment		
High School or More	64.7	540,786
Less than High School	61.7	106,750
Ethnicity		
Black	69.4	131,969
Hispanic	72.0	39,621
Not Black, Not Hispanic	71.1	582,217
Race		
Black	66.1	192,694
White	72.0	590,216
Other	67.5	18,094
Region		
South	76.1	278,799
Nonsouth	69.5	473,975
Urban vs. Rural Residence		
Raised in Town or City	70.3	640,163
Raised in Country (not farm)	68.9	131,132
Raised on Farm/Ranch	64.4	40,058
Father's Occupation		
Professional, Technical	73.9	66,925
Business (mgrs.,sales)	70.2	103,793
White Collar (clerical)	79.0	25,149
Blue Collar	67.3	412,344
Farmer	85.4	4,277

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

This general conclusion is consistent with the findings of other sociological research on an analogous phenomenon. The extent and strength of attachment to local community is influenced more powerfully by one's length of residence in the community than by factors associated with socio-economic status. (2) Length of residence, in this research, stands as proxy for the processes of micro-socialization based on the numerous interpersonal interchanges which characterize participation in neighborhood affairs. By analogy, our own hypothesis is that patriotic attitudes are generated and conveyed in large degree through primary group relationships within the family and among friends, especially those who have had some military experience.

2. Interpersonal Influence on Enlistment Decisions

In a series of interviews with active duty personnel, done by Faris in 1982, the question, "How did it come about that you came into the military?", elicited many detailed histories of steps and events, often occuring over a period of years, that were ultimately resolved by the action of enlistment. A common theme of these personal histories is the important influence of friends and relatives on decisions to enlist. A similar theme can be identified in data drawn from the AFEES and Youth Attitude Tracking Studies (YATS). In this section we briefly review the evidence documenting the important effect family and friends have on decisions to enlist. The analytic framework is

based on the interview data, but we draw freely from the survey data when relevant data are available and bear on the main point.

Family Influence

The influence of family members on decisions to enlist is not all of one kind, but varies depending on the role of the influential family member (parent, sib, or surrogate) and on that member's military experience. One important type of family influence is exerted by fathers who had been or are currently on active duty as members of the career force. Many youths are subject to such influence. In 1980, 5.2% of all military age youth were military offspring. (3) Table 3-2 shows that those whose fathers were in the career force are evidently overrepresented in accessions as reflected in the 1979 AFEES sample. At present, military offspring comprise approximately 10% or more of enlisted accessions; 12% of Army E3/E4s have fathers who served twenty years or more in the military. (4) Not that accounts of recruits from military families reflect strong direct encouragement to enlist by the military father. Instead, explanations of why these recruits joined the military reflect a long-term incorporation of attitudes which regard military service as honorable and patriotic, as well as a greater exposure to the attractions (and disadvantages) of military life than experienced by most civilians.

Another pattern of influence is reported by recruits who cite their fathers' military experience as a non-career member as a significant and positive influence on their own

Table 3-2. Father's Years of Military Service by Sex

No. of Years	Males	Females	Total
Unknown	12.1	19.3	13.6
Not Applicable	32.4	35.8	33.1
Missing	10.8	5.9	9.8
less than 4	17.0	12.0	16.0
4-9	17.2	14.4	16.6
10-19	2.7	2.6	2.7
20 or more	7.8	9.9	8.2
n=	(5,672)	(1,476)	(7,148)

Source: 1979 APERS

decision to enlist. Of males whose children now compose the military recruiting pool the majority are veterans, primarily as a result of World War II and Korean War mobilizations. Of course, the proportion of 18 year-olds whose fathers are veterans is declining, as the generation fathered by those who served in World War II ages past the military recruiting years.

The influence across generations, however, does not depend solely on the father's military experience. Sometimes the decisive influence affecting the decision to enlist is reported by the recruit to be exerted by a "surrogate father"--a benevolent employer, an uncle, or a step-father. In such instances, the surrogate father tends to be someone with a current involvement with the military, either as a reservist or as a member of the active forces, as opposed to having served at an earlier time only. Surrogates are reported to have been more active in encouraging recruits to consider entering the military, than most natural fathers. Recruits for whom such surrogate fathers are an important influence have usually not been living with their fathers, who are deceased, divorced, or not present for other reasons.

Finally, there are recruits who refer to the influence exerted, on their decision to enlist, by a sibling (usually a brother) who served, or more typically, is serving on active duty (Table 3-3). In such cases the recruit tends to regard contact with this sibling as the principal factor in the decision to enlist. The content of this influence is not so much a matter of transmission of "marketing"

Table 3-3. Number of Siblings Ever on Active Duty By Sex

	Male	Female	Total
None	67.6	62.3	66.5
One	22.0	24.3	22.6
Two	6.5	8.4	6.9
Three	1.9	2.9	2.2
Four	0.8	1.2	0.9
Five or more	1.0	0.9	1.0
n=	(4,940)	(1,362)	(6,304)

Note: Base is total respondents with at least one sibling.

Source: 1979 AFEES survey

Table 3-4. Number of Friends in Military Service Reported by 16-21 Year-Old Civilian Males by Propensity to Enlist

Number of Friends in Military Service	Propensity to Enlist	
	Positive	Negative
None	16.9	26.1
Only a Few	33.2	39.4
Several	43.3	31.5
Majority	6.6	2.9
n=	(1,404)	(3,728)

Source: YATS, Spring 1979.

information about the availability of training opportunities and material benefits--these may figure in, of course--as it is of intimate contact with someone who has absorbed and who to some degree manifests what might be called the "military mystique." One illustration of this influence is the widespread disappointment reported by Army basic trainees in the early 1970's when they found that the night infiltration course, the traditional climactic episode of basic training in which recruits crawl under live machine gun fire, and about which they had heard from relatives, elder sibs, and friends, had been deleted from the training program.

Influence of Military Friends

Recruits also cite contacts with friends who had already entered the military as significant events in the process by which their own decision to enter the military took place. This confirms the YATS data, shown in Table 3-4, that youths having military friends are more likely to have a positive propensity to enlist. But this is not to say that the influence of military friends operates in a simple, "linear" fashion.

In some cases military friends provide positive encouragement to join the military, usually on grounds other than merely the calculative advantages of pay, benefits, and training. The reports of new recruits of their reactions to their first home leave provide some insight into the nature of this type of influence. Almost invariably these recruits recount the experience of finding that the activities of their civilian friends--cruising in cars, etc.--which only

months before had seemed of central importance to their own lives, now seem childish and irsignificant. The recruit on leave communicates to civilian friends his satisfaction with his personal development and sense of being involved in an important institution. A number of such recruits report that one or more civilian friends made a decision to enlist on the basis of these contacts.

In other cases, the prospective recruit finds that friends with military experience are either uncommital or negative regarding the advisability of enlisting in the military. Survey evidence show that many on active duty, especially junior enlisted personnel, are likely to make a negative recommendaton to a civilian friend who is considering joining the military. The August 1981-February 1982 Soldiers Report indicated that only about half of first-term enlisted personnel would recommend service in the Army to a friend or relative who had just finished high school. (5) Nevertheless, in interviews, recruits report that the result of "negative" ccntacts was that they "wanted to see for themselves" and so went ahead and enlisted.

More than other surveys, the YATS data document the actual impact of the putative influence of family and friends on enlistment decisions. The YATS sample of military aged youth in the recruiting pool was asked whether they had talked with parents and friends with military experience about possibly enlisting in the military. Those who regard themselves as definitely or probably enlisting in the military are especially likely to have discussed the possibility with one or both parents. From 1976 through

1981, at least 50% of these "positive propensity" respondents reported having discussed the possibility of enlisting with one or both parents. In contrast, only about 25% of the "negative propensity" respondents reported having had similar discussions with their parents. Positive propensity civilian males are also more likely to have discussed the possibility of enlistment with friends who have served or are serving in the military. As with discussions with parents, more than half of the positive propensity group report having discussed the possibility of enlisting with friends with military experience, compared to between a quarter and a third of the negative propensity group.

Further, the positive propensity group is more likely to have had repeated discussions about enlisting with parents and friends (Table 3-5). Of those reporting having had discussions, the positive propensity group was more likely to have discussed the possibility of enlistment "quite a few times" with fathers, mothers and friends, and less likely to have had such a discussion only once. It could be, of course, that those who are positively oriented toward joining the military are more likely to bring the idea forward for discussion with parents. Yet the YATS data also show that, at least to some degree, these discussions transmit positive influence from parents and friends toward a decision to enlist. (6)

Finally, the YATS data provide evidence of the influence of family and friends on self-reported decisions to make contact with a service recruiter regardless of propensity to

Table 3-5. Frequency of Discussions About Possible Enlistment Among 16-21 Year-Old Civilian Males by Propensity to Enlist

Discussions	Propensity to Enlist	
	Positive	Negative
With Father		
Once	15.1	28.9
Several Times	47.4	46.4
Quite a Few Times	36.1	22.7
With Mother		
Once	20.2	31.8
Several Times	44.6	46.2
Quite a Few Times	34.2	20.4
With Friends		
Once	12.7	17.6
Several Times	52.4	58.9
Quite a Few Times	32.5	20.9

Note: Base is total having discussions with father, mother or friends.

Source: YATS, Spring 1979.

enlist. Table 3-6 shows that all youths who initiated contact with a recruiter are much more likely to report having done so because of "influential others" (parents, friends, etc.) than because of advertising. This was true for all services, with influential others being the primary motivation for more than 40% and advertising for less than 10%. As Table 3-7 shows, three of the top five influence sources, which positively orient young males to military service, are interpersonal contacts with family and friends.

In sum, there is little doubt that primary group ties with family and friends are important in channelling some youths toward and others away from military service. The substantive issue of particular interest here is the relation between these interpersonal contacts and the transmission of patriotic attitudes. Questionnaire surveys, even of the careful sort devised for the 1979 AFEES survey and the NLS, cannot easily detect phenomena describing how values and attitudes are transmitted across generations or among peers. The researcher undertaking a secondary analysis of survey data can only try, by wit and indirection, to glean what inklings he can from what is available.

The 1979 AFEES survey item on reasons for enlistment (identical to that used in the NLS) has only one factor in which any of the above processes are directly evident. This is the factor of family tradition, which is a special case and among the least frequently mentioned of the various sources of interpersonal influence by all recruits. Even recruits who were strongly influenced to enlist by a father

Table 3-6. Impact of Advertising and Influential Others on Recruiter Contact

Service Contacted	Propensity to Enlist	% Contacting Recruiter In Response to Influential Others	Advertising
Marine Corps	Positive	47.5	7.2
	Negative	49.2	0.8
Army	Positive	45.4	8.0
	Negative	38.5	3.4
Air Force	Positive	40.9	3.0
	Negative	41.3	3.7
Navy	Positive	39.4	4.5
	Negative	40.9	6.4

Note: Base is all respondents who contacted recruiter.
Source: YATS, Fall 1978.

Table 3-7. Percent of All 16-21 Year-Old Civilian Males Reporting Being Favorably Influenced to Enlist By Top 5 Influence Sources

Influence Source	%
One or Both Parents	9.3
Other Friends	8.9
Recruiting Literature Recieved in Mail	7.0
Friends Now or Formerly in Service	4.8
Information Solicited by Mail	4.6

Note: Base is all respondents; respondents were free to choose more than one source

Source: YATS, Spring 1981.

who made a career of military service might not regard themselves as coming from a family tradition of military service. The findings of the AFEES and NLS (unweighted data) which show between 10 and 15 percent of all recruits citing family tradition as a reason for enlisting, may thus represent the "tip of the iceberg" of the more extensive processes of interpersonal transmission of patriotic motivations for enlisting in the military. Evidence supporting such a conclusion is shown in Table 3-8. Whether we examine the 1979 AFEES data or the (unweighted) NLS data, those who report joining the armed forces because of family tradition are more likely to report having joined for patriotic reasons as well. The significance of this finding can only be established, however, by surveys having a more appropriate research design to treat the question. Still, there is ground for supposing that the relationship uncovered here is worth our careful attention.

Table 3-9 shows the relation between military friends' feelings toward enlisting and reports of patrictic motivation. The pattern observed confirms what we saw in Table 3-8. The more positive military friends were toward the idea of enlisting, the higher the percentage of the group who reported patriotic reasons for enlisting. This table is especially important because, unlike reports about family traditon, we do not face the problem of a (comparatively) small n-size. Nearly two-thirds of those responding to these two items on the AFEES survey reported having military friends who had positive feelings about their enlistment. This large proportion of respondents was

Table 3-8. Influence of Family Tradition on Percent Reporting Patriotic Motive for Enlisting

Data Survey	Cited Family Tradition	Reason for Enlisting % Reporting Patriotic Motive	Base
AFEES, 1979	Yes	93.0	669
	No	81.4	6143
NLS, 1980 (unweighted)	Yes	82.2	146
	No	63.5	812

Table 3-9. Influence of Friends on Percent Reporting Patriotic Motive for Enlisting

	Good Idea	Not Good Idea	Does not Apply	Total
Cited Service to Country	87.7	77.9	82.2	84.9
Did Not Cite Service To Country	12.3	22.1	17.8	15.1
n=	(3,642)	(1,022)	(1,088)	(5,752)

Source 1979 AFEES.

over 10% more likely to report patriotic motives than those having friends who felt their enlistment was a bad idea.

Clearly, more research is required on this subject. The weight of the evidence, whether sample-survey or informal interview, point to the importance of family and friends in fashioning enlistment decisions. More important for us, they suggest that these contacts are channels through which patriotic attitudes are transmitted.

3. The Influence of Macrosocial Factors

In addition to interpersonal variables, we have to pay attention to macrosociological factors. The substance of microsocial processes depends on the historical and cultural context. Within American society, patriotic motivations, transmitted across generations within families and among friends, are sustained by widespread trust and appreciation of the nation's political traditions and institutions. (7) In this context, transmission of a patriotic attitude is effected by the course of current political events, and the role of the military in them, as portrayed by government leaders and in the mass media.

We are dealing, first of all, with a stable political culture. It is noteworthy that Americans have been characterized by the trust they place in their political institutions. In the 1950s, 85% of a national, cross-sectional survey sample cited some feature of America's political institutions--its constitution,

freedoms, democratic practices, etc.--as the "thing" they were most proud of about their country. (8) The finding restates in the quantitative terms familiar to social science what observers from de Tocqueville on have observed and found remarkable about American society. (9) This continuity of trust in national political institutions, lasting well over a century and a half, nurtures patriotic attitudes; it facilitates and justifies their transmission. Treating military service as a legitimate obligation of citizenship, in particular, requires a high level of confidence in the effective functioning of government. In the United States, historically, tension between military and democratic institutions has been eased by the longstanding traditions of military service by citizen soldiers and the subordination of military institutions to civilian control.

Still there has been, in recent years, a departure from the long-term trend. Beginning in the 1960s, surveys have recorded substantial declines in the level of trust people place in the nation's political institutions. If the foregoing argument is correct, this shift in public attitude makes it more difficult to form patriotic attitudes and strains the connection between serving one's country and military service. We do not have data, unfortunately, to test the hypothesis directly, but in the absence of data, social scientists have to devise indirect measures. It is possible, for instance, to compare treatment of patriotic themes and of the military as found in the mass media.

A rich store of data are available for content analysis

in the three areas of mass entertainment, news and journalism, and advertising. One might compare the content of war films from the 1950s--e.g., "Run Silent, Run Deep"--with the content of more recent films in the genre--e.g., the "Deerhunter." Or, one might contrast the frequency of and prominence accorded public statements by political leaders regarding the role of the armed forces in fulfilling the country's foreign policy (again) from the 1950s to the present. One might even undertake longitudinal content analysis of the military's advertising campaigns as an important source of information about its own changing self-image. In each case, our hypothesis is that explicit attention paid to the military's primary mission (and to its relation with particular national objectives) has declined. Other, in some sense peripheral, concerns--with problems associated with individual welfare or with the gratification of individual interests--have helped fill the void. In some cases, the void may not be filled at all. As Jonathon Alford has noted with reference to the British armed forces, it is a critical problem to define the mission of an all-volunteer force in peacetime. (10)

The point of speculating like this, apart from pointing out areas for more research, is to draw attention to the complicated, reciprocal relationship between macrosocial and microsocial processes through which patriotic values are shaped and carried on.

The postulated decline of explicit attention to the military's primary role in American society obscures the connection between military service and service to one's

country. In Alford's view, in Britain, "military service has become an end itself" and an "attractive alternative to other forms of civilian employment." As a result, he fears, "the fostering of martial qualities will take second place to the satisfaction of personal needs--a poor recipe for a well motivated soldier, sailor or airman." (11) Our own concerns focus on the impact on civil-military relations especially with youth. Failure to connect, on the micro and macro levels, one's obligations as citizen with the military's responsibility to perform its mission cultivates an inconsistent, if not contradictory, attitude toward the military among youth. So it is that high school seniors surveyed from 1976 to 1980 report increasing support for a "strong" military establishment, even for military superiority, while at the same time the proportion who expect and prefer to serve declines. (12) There is evidently a growing disjuncture between expectations placed on the military and on one's own responsibility to see these expectations fulfilled.

The patriotic attitude, in other words, cannot be regarded simply as a "dependent variable" caused by microsocial processes of family and friendship influence. Microsocial processes are important and they do shape one's attitude toward the military as a place to serve one's country. But they operate in a dynamic environment. The substance of patriotic attitudes is fashioned decisively by macrosocial factors as well. As a result, the patriotic attitude can be looked upon as a bridging mechanism which helps render coherent the relationship between an

individual's local world of primary group relationships and his larger participation in the nation-state. To say this, however, is to recognize that patriotic attitudes can also operate as an independent causual factor conditioning the operation of the very macro- and micro-social factors on which their transmission over time depends. The next chapter examines the implications of this issue by exploring the impact of patriotic motivations on the role-selection and performance of enlisted personnel currently serving in the military.

Notes

1. Edward Shils and Morris Janowitz, "Cohesion and Disintegration in the Wehrmacht in World War II," Center and Periphery, (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1975), pp. 345-383.

2. Morris Janowitz and David Street, "Changing Social Order of the Metropolitan Area," Handbook of Contemporary Urban Life, ed. David Street, (San Francisco: Jossey-Bass, 1978), pp. 90-128, esp. 109-110.

3. Albert D Biderman and Barbara A. Haley, An Exploratory Study of Intergenerational Occupational Succession in the Navy, (Washington, D. C.: Bureau of Social Science Research, Inc., 1979).

4. John H. Faris, "The All-Volunteer Force: Recruitment from Military Families", Armed Forces and Society (Summer, 1981), pp. 545-559.

5. Human Resources Development Directorate, Department of the Army, Soldiers Report: Results of the August 1981 and February 1982 Semi-Annual Soldiers Surveys, (Wasington, D.C.: xerox).

6. The extent to which fathers, mothers, wives/girlfriends, friends with military experience, and other friends are in favor of the respondent's enlisting is linked to his propensity to join the military. A majority of positive propensity respondents reported that their friends who had served or were serving in the military were in favor of

their enlisting, compared to one-third of the negative-propensity group. This finding is quite consistent with that from the 1979 AFEES (Table 3-6).) The fathers of the positive propensity civilian males were also frequently reported as being in favor of a decision to join the military, mothers and civilian friends less frequently so, and wives/girlfriends rarely so. In each case, though, the positive propensity group much more frequently reported positive support for a decision to enlist than did the negative propensity group.

7. Morris Janowitz, "Patriotism and the U.S. All-Volunteer Military," Air University Review (January/February 1982), p. 37.

8. Cited by Alexander Inkles, "Continuity and Change in the American National Character," The Third Century, ed. S.M. Lipset, (Stanford: Hoover Institution Press, 1979), p. 398.

9. Ibid.

10. Jonathan Alford, "Deterrence and Disuse," Armed Forces and Society 6 (winter, 1980), p. 251.

11. Ibid.

12. Jerald G. Bachman, Trends in High School Senior's Views of the Military, Monitoring the Future Occasional Paper 12, (Ann Arbor: Institute for Social Research, University of Michigan, 1981), p. 15.

CHAPTER IV

THE IMPACT OF PATRIOTIC MOTIVES ON MILITARY SERVICE

In this chapter we examine the impact of patrictic attitudes on military service. The issues raised are difficult and controversial. They embrace the theoretical relationships between personality variables and conditions of work. But the central concerns are more broadly based. Adopting the all-volunteer format for recruiting in 1973 radically altered the conditions of service and gave wider range for processes of self-selection to determine the social composition of the armed forces. Now, almost ten years later, it is clear that the relatively disadvantaged have volunteered at higher rates than others and are heavily overrepresented in the enlisted ranks. Questions are raised about the quality of such a force and about the fairness of distributing the burdens of defense unequally throughout society. Our focus, then, is on the impact of patriotic attitudes on the social representativeness and on the quality of the armed forces.

Basing our analysis on the NLS Survey data (see Appendix A), we will address three questions. First, are those who report joining the military for patriotic reasons more likely than others to serve in combat or other military-oriented, in contrast with civilian-oriented, positions? At issue is whether patriotic motivations affect

the process of self-selection for the military role. This question is treated in section 1. Second, how does the distribution of patriotic attitudes affect the social representativeness of the enlisted ranks, especially in combat and military-oriented positons? Is the patriotic attitude systematically associated with the social background of those who serve? If so, does it reenforce the present tendency toward a socially unrepresentative enlisted force? These questions are treated in section 2. And third, do patriotic attitudes affect the role performance of those who serve? Or, in other words, how do those serving for patriotic reasons compare in quality to those who serve for other reasons? This question is treated in section 3.

In general, we shall argue that patriotic motivations are a crucial factor in understanding self-selection for military roles, in mitigating the extent to which disadvantaged youths are overrepresented in combat and military-oriented positions, and in explaining the quality of one's role performance.

1. Self-Selection and the Military Role

Before examining the relationship between patriotic attitudes and one's military role, we must first consider what we mean by the "process of self-selection" and then assess its relevance for our study of the all-volunteer force.

The term "self-selecton" refers to the tendency in people

to occupy roles for which they are suited by personal predispositions, talents, and value orientations. The idea is borrowed from evolutionary theory. Natural selection favors animals which are adapted to their environmental niche; those which are not either move on to other places or are selected against. Analogously, where self-selection is free to work, we expect that people will occupy jobs that fit their personality, modify their jobs to better the fit, or else move on to other jobs. (1) There are limits of course to how "free" processes of self-selection can be. Restrictions impinge on two levels. First, people do not have perfect knowledge either of role requirements or of their own capacities and so sometimes they misjudge their suitability to hold a particular position. Second, labor markets have imperfections as well. Opportunities for movement into more suitable positions may be restricted for a variety of rational and nonrational reasons. To recognize these restrictions is only to specify the conditions under which self-selection operates as an important social process.

In principle, ending conscription in favor of voluntary enlistment greatly expanded the role of self-selection for filling enlisted positions within the military. Yet when this policy was adopted, there was no consensus on what the consequences would be.

The Gates Commission put forward the simplest hypothesis. While admitting that eliminating conscription was a "major" social change, the commissioners doubted that reliance on volunteers would produce any major changes in the social

composition of the armed forces. (2) They argued that most of those who served in the military even under conscription were volunteers. Consequently, the impact of self-selection for military roles was already well-known and not problematic. "An all-volunteer force," they wrote, "will be manned largely by the same kind of individuals as today's armed forces," they will be similar "in patriotism, political attitude, affectiveness, and susceptibility to civilian control." (3)

Underlying their argument was the conviction that value orientations which people bring with them into the military are not fundamentally modified by changes in the conditions of work. Research they had done before preparing their recommendations persuaded them that the experience of miltary service had no significant impact on either the attitudes or future life chances of those who served. (4) The implications of such a view for recruitment were obvious. The commissioners recognized that people volunteer to serve in the armed forces "for a variety of reasons, including a sense of duty." (5) Consequently, "eliminating the financial penalty first-term servicemen presently suffer and improving other conditions of service will not suddenly change the motives and basic attitudes of new recruits." (6) Of course if the attitudes and motivations of volunteers did not vary when job conditions changed, then there was no reason to expect that greater reliance on self-selection would much alter the composition of the all-volunteer force.

The data we have do not permit us to test this essentially historical hypothesis. Time series data are

required. Yet we can recognize that the Gates Commission's argument on this particular matter is not inconsistent with ours. In the opening chapter of this report, we observed that there had been a persistence of patriotic motives among enlisted personnel throughout the period of the all-volunteer force and despite the variety of changes to levels of pay and conditions of work. The present question is whether that persistence is related to the process of self-selection for military roles. Lacking data on the distribution of patriotic attitudes among civilian youths, we must address ourselves to the levels of reported patriotic motivation by occupants of various positons within the military.

Our hypothesis is that levels of reported patriotic motivation will be positively associated with occupational positions more oriented to combat roles than to roles found in the civilian sector. Our assumption is that those who join the military to serve their country are more likely to be attracted by roles that embody the military's primary task. The data reported in Table 4-1 supply substantial evidence in favor of our hypothesis. Those who occupy combat positions in the infantry, on gun crews, or as seaman specialists are most likely to have reported patriotic motives for enlisting. In contrast, those who occupy civilian-oriented positions as administrators, craftsmen, or in communications are least likely to report patriotic motives for enlisting. Put generally, the table shows that there is a positive association between occupying a military-oriented role and the level of patriotic

Table 4-1. Self-Selection for the Military Role

Military Occupational Specialty	% Reporting Patrictic Motive %	Base
Combat		
Infantry, Guncrew, Seamanship Specialist	74.0	58,933
Military Oriented		
Electronic Equipment Repairmen	72.7	25,666
Medical and Dental Specialists	71.7	13,323
Non-Occupational (trainees)	70.9	35,961
Civilian Oriented		
Service and Supply Handlers	65.4	42,336
Electrical/Mechanical Equipment Repairmen	64.2	121,834
Functional Support and Administration	62.2	47,933
Other Technical and Allied Specialists	57.4	9,769
Communications and Intelligence Specialists	48.9	23,287
Craftsmen	46.3	6,491

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

motivations.

There are of course alternative hypotheses to be considered. Not everyone believes that so radically altering the basis of recruitment into the military has benign consequences. Some fear that deemphasizing the citizen-soldier concept of obligatory service while at the same time emphasizing pecuniary rewards leads the enlisted force to become a refuge for the economically disadvantaged. This is not to deny the impact of self-selection, but rather to see it in a different light. Given the choice to serve or not, the military is most likely to be attractive to those who either face truncated opportunity structures in the civilian sector or are "pro-military" or "gung ho" in attitude. In the first case, self-selection would effectively transform the social composition of the enlisted ranks so that persons from advantaged backgrounds are underrepresented. In the second case, self-selection would swell the enlisted ranks with those disposed to violent or aggressive techniques of problem-solving.

Empirically, there are data to support the hypothesis that the military will be attractive to the relatively disadvantaged. Few doubt that the social representativeness of the enlisted ranks declined during the 1970's. At present, racial minorities and whites with low educational attainments are overrepresented. (7) As shown in Table 4-2, those who come from racial minorities or who have lower educational attainments are somewhat more likely than others to hold combat and military-oriented roles in the armed forces.

Table 4-2. Self-Selection for Military Role By Race, Education and Contact with Criminal Justice System

	Percent in Occupation			
	Combat	Military-Oriented	Civilian-Oriented	Base
Race				
White	16.0	21.9	62.1	425,472
Black	25.4	16.8	57.8	110,783
Other	23.6	13.2	63.2	18,359
Educational Attainment				
Some College	5.5	32.3	62.2	21,818
High School	13.5	20.3	66.2	275,932
Less than H.S.	22.0	13.0	65.0	90,251
Contact with Criminal Justice System				
Yes	26.5	18.4	55.0	229,013
No	12.9	21.2	65.9	339,091

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

The second hypothesis about a military predisposition is plausible, but difficult to credit. In their study of the all-volunteer force, Bachman, Blair and Segal argued that military men with career interests were more "promilitary" in outlook than noncareer men or their civilian counterparts. (8) But the empirical consequences of that difference in outlook have not been clearly shown. More to the point, a moderately high proportion of youths (19.6% of whites; 17.3% overall) entering the military require moral waivers to excuse a prior record of "criminal" offense. But almost all of these offences (77.3% of offences by whites; 78.6% of offences by all) involve minor traffic violations or misdemeanors. (9) Nevertheless, if we expand the net to include among those with "promilitary" (read violent or aggressive) predispositions any who have been stopped, booked or convicted of any offences (excluding minor traffic offences), then we find, as shown in Table 4-2, that those having had contact with the criminal justice system are more likely than others to hold combat and military-oriented roles in the armed forces.

In sum, jobs clearly linked to the military's primary mission are more attractive to those who see military service as one way to serve their country, to those who come from relatively disadvantaged social positions and to those who have had contact with the criminal justice system. It is arguable that processes of self-selection are at work in each case. But though they are, there is no reason to suppose that each process works to produce the same effect.

2. Patriotic Motives and Social Representativeness

We want to know how the various social bases of self-selection are related to one another. In particular, we want to determine whether self-selection based on occupying disadvantaged social positions differs in impact from self-selection based on patriotic motives and, if so, how. At issue substantively is whether patriotic motivations for joining the armed forces have reenforced or offset the observed tendencies toward a socially unrepresentative enlisted force.

First let us see whether rates of reporting patriotic motivations for enlisting vary systematically with the racial identity or educational attainments of enlisted personnel. There is no reason theoretically to expect that the social process of transmitting a normative and positive orientation toward the military (a process described in Chapter III) depends crucially on a youth's racial or educatonal background. Our hypothesis, therefore, is that patriotic motivation varies independently of these factors.

The data reported in Table 4-3 support our hypothesis. There is virtually no difference in the proportion of youth who report enlisting for patriotic reasons by the different ethnic identifications. There is some difference in the proportions when categories are defined in terms of race. The difference suggests that blacks (at 66.1%) and other minorities (at 67.5%) are somewhat less likely than whites (at 72.0%) to report enlisting for patriotic reasons. Yet no weight should be attached to these differences. They are

Table 4-3. Percent Reporting Patriotic Motivation By Race and Educational Attainment

	%	Base
Ethnicity		
Black	69.4	131,969
Hispanic	72.0	39,621
Not Black, Not Hispanic	71.1	582,217
Race		
Black	66.1	192,694
White	72.0	590,216
Other	67.5	18,094
Educational Attainment		
High School or More	64.7	540,786
Less than High School	61.7	106,750

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

not substantively significant. Race accounts for less than 1% of the total variation in reports of patriotic motivation (R-square= 0.0003). Finally, there is a slight, but hardly significant, tendency for those with higher educational attainments to say they joined the military for patriotic reasons. These findings of "no difference" are significant, for they suggest that patriotic motives offset rather than reenforce cleavages within the enlisted ranks. We can show how they do so by examining the relationship beween patriotic motivations and education in greater detail.

It is well-known that military-oriented roles and especially combat positions are more likely to be held by those having low educational attainments. (10) We have seen (Table 4-2) that the NLS data do not contradict the pattern. We know further (from Table 4-1) that those who are patriotically motivated are more likely to occupy military-oriented and combat positions. The question is, do they do so regardless of educational attainment? Or, are those who have less education more likely than those who have more education to fill such positions? The data in Table 4-4 allow us to answer the question. The general pattern of course is not surprising. Those who report patriotic motives and those with lower educational attainments are both more likely to occupy combat and military-oriented positions. What is important to see is that the effect of patriotic motivation holds across levels of educational attainment. Those who have not graduated from high school are about 1.6 times more likely to occupy

Table 4-4. Percent in Military Occupation By Educational Attainment Controlling for Reported Patriotic Motivation

Educational Attainment	Percent in Military Occupation			
	Combat	Military Oriented	Civilian Oriented	Base
Reported Patriotic Motive				
Some College	7.5	33.6	58.9	16,060
High School	15.5	21.0	63.5	185,590
Less than H.S.	25.7	16.8	57.5	55,060
Subtotal	17.2	20.9	61.9	256,720
Did not Report Patriotic Motive				
Some College	0	28.7	71.3	5,750
High School	9.3	18.9	71.9	90,314
Less than H.S.	16.4	7.0	76.6	35,191
Subtotal	10.8	16.2	73.1	131,275

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

combat roles if they report patriotic motivations than if they do not. The same can be said of those who have a high school education. Note that these with some college occupy a combat role only if they report patriotic motives for enlisting. A similar effect is observed if we include military-oriented positions in our analysis. In short, patriotic motivations increase the educational representativeness of the enlisted ranks in the very roles where representativeness is least expected.

Patriotic motives also mitigate the extent to which those who had contact with the criminal justice system are likely to occupy combat positions. The relevant data are reported in Table 4-5. As expected, those who had contact with the criminal justice system are more likely to occupy combat roles. (They are not more likely to occupy military-oriented positions.) Noteworthy, however, is that the percentage of those who had contact with the criminal justice system and occupy combat roles decreases from 30.5% to 19.8% as we move from those who do not to those who report having enlisted for patriotic reasons. On the other side, the percentage of those who had no such contact and occupy combat roles increases from 9.7% to 15.9% as we move from those who do not to those who report having enlisted for patriotic reasons. In sum, patriotic motives narrow the gap which separates those occupying combat roles who have and have not had contact with the criminal justice system.

Overall, the impact of patriotic motivations is consistently to offset rather than reenforce the tendency toward social unrepresentativeness whether based on social

Table. 4-5. Percent in Military Occupation By Contact With Criminal Justice System, Controlling for Reported Patriotic Motivation

Contact with Criminal Justice System	Percent in Military Occupation: Combat	Military Oriented	Civilian Oriented	Base
Mentioned Patriotic Motivation				
Yes	19.8	18.5	61.6	82,852
No	15.9	22.1	62.0	173,999
Subtotal	17.2	20.9	61.9	256,851
Failed to Mention Patriotic Motivation				
Yes	30.5	18.3	51.2	146,162
No	9.7	20.3	69.9	165,051
Subtotal	19.5	19.4	61.1	311,213

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

background (race, education) or a personal predisposition toward aggressive behavior (indicated crudely by contact with the criminal justice system).

3. Assessing Role Performance

An important additional question about the impact of patriotic motivation on military service concerns role performance. Information on this subject is extremely limited. One recent study, however, suggests that those who enter the service for patriotic reasons are better able to assimilate the military role than those who enter for other reasons. Based on a small sample of basic combat trainees, a central finding of this study was that graduates of basic training are twice as likely to report enlisting for patriotic motives as are those discharged from the service before completing basic training. (11) We can generalize from this finding and hypothesize that the role performance of patriotically motivated personnel will be significantly different and or higher quality than the role performance of other personnel. Problems arise of course, in determining how to measure the quality of role performances, especially when we have to rely on survey data. Such problems are difficult, but they are not insurmountable.

Assessments of role performance are both subjective and objective. Subjectively, we each judge for ourselves whether our own activity in a particular role meets, exceeds, or falls short of the standards of behavior which

we think are appropriate to that role. The more we meet or exceed the standards expected, the more likely we are to be satisfied with our role performance; all things being equal, the more likely we are also to be willing to remain in that role or in one similar to it. This is just an extension of the argument we already made about the process of self-selection. It is an important extension because it permits us to argue that expressions of satisfaction with one's term of enlistment or of plans to reenlist are not just expressions of empty sentiment. Rather they provide us with an indicator of how enlisted personnel subjectively evaluate their own role performance.

Objectively, others judge our performance for themselves. On the basis of their evaluation--which is often collective and made according to an institutionalized practice--we are promoted to a more responsible position or give higher rewards for continuing in our present position, we are left alone to carry on as we have been, or, perhaps, we are demoted or otherwise removed from the role we once occupied. Objective evaluations of role performance, in other words, often leave their record in the altered role status of the person who was evaluated. For our purposes, we can consider the movement of enlisted personnel through pay grades to be an indicator of objective assessments of role performance. To consider our hypothesis--that role performance is positively associated with patriotic motivations--we are able to draw on both subjective and objective measures.

Data bearing on our hypothesis which draw on subjective measures are reported in Table 4-6. There we find three

Table 4-6. Percent Reporting Patriotic Motivation and Satisfaction with Military Service

Measure of Satisfaction with Service	Percent Reporting Patriotic Motivation %	Base
Degree of Satisfaction with Most Recent Term of Service		
Very Satisfied	79.4	53,714
Somewhat Satisfied	69.9	255,592
Somewhat Dissatisfied	60.7	138,659
Very Dissatisfied	55.2	79,060
Length of Term Resopnent Expects to Serve		
Short (1-4 years)	67.5	509,732
Intermediate (5-8 years)	68.3	179,779
Long (9 or more years)	89.7	116,534
Reenlistment Plans		
Definitly will	95.8	26,289
Probably will	83.1	127,033
Probably will not	70.4	148,073
Definitely will not	50.7	204,623

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

separate indicators of individual satisfaction with their role performance, ranging from degree of satisfaction with most recent term of service to plans for reenlistment. All three show a strong positive association between satisfaction or commitment to role and the level of reported patriotic motivation. Of these the strongest measure is reenlistment plans. Of those who say they definitely will reenlist, 95.8% report enlisting for patriotic reasons. Of those who say they definitely will not reenlist, only 50.7% report enlisting for patriotic reasons. Note that this one variable explains nearly all of the variable in reported patriotic motivation (R-square= 0.940). Overall, the data provide strong support for the proposition that positive subjective assessments of role performance are positively associated with the level of reported patriotic motivation. It is important to go on to see whether objective measures confirm this relationship.

On a superficial analysis they do not. The association between pay grade and reports of patriotic motivation without further controls is plainly negative. That it is only shows how careful one must be when using cross-sectional data to answer questions about the outcome of social process. It is appropriate in this case to control for length of service. When we do, as reported in Table 4-7, the association between pay grade and patriotic motives is shown to be positive. A larger percentage of those who reported patriotic motivations occupy higher pay grades than those who do not. The pattern is especially clear in the higher pay grades (above E-4) for those who

Table 4-7. Percent in Pay Grade By Reported Patriotic Motivation Controlling for Length of Service

Percent in Pay Grade	Reported Patriotic Motivations Yes	No	Overall
Enlisted 1974			
E1-E3	0	0	0
E4	20.9	55.4	35.5
E5	42.2	44.6	43.2
E6-E9	36.8	0	21.2
	(2,465)	(1,810)	(4,274)
Enlisted 1975			
E1-E3	22.1	9.6	17.2
E4	41.2	58.3	47.9
E5	36.6	32.1	34.9
E6-E9	0	0	0
	(14,811)	(9,501)	(24,312)
Enlisted 1976			
E1-E3	15.4	25.1	18.2
E4	61.2	57.6	60.2
E5	23.4	17.2	21.6
E6-E9	0	0	0
	(80,745)	(32,520)	(113,265)

Table 4-7. Percent in Pay Grade By Reported Patriotic Motivation Controlling for Length of Service (Cont'd)

Percent in Pay Grade	Reported Patriotic Motivations Yes	No	Overall
Enlisted 1977			
E1-E3	23.6	34.2	26.6
E4	69.5	58.9	66.5
E5	6.8	7.0	6.9
E6-E9	0	0	0
	(143,714)	(56,279)	(199,993)
Enlisted in 1978			
E1-E3	61.1	61.9	61.4
E4	35.8	34.7	35.4
E5	3.1	3.4	3.2
E6-E9	0	0	0
	(104,774)	(70,0180)	(174,792)
Enlisted 1979			
E1-E3	87.7	97.4	92.8
E4	12.3	0	6.2
E5	0	2.6	1.3
E6-E9	0	0	0
	(6,424)	(6,205)	(12,629)

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

enlisted before 1977. It is more clear in the grade of E-4 for those who enlisted in 1977 or later. When interpreting these data our assumption is that the rate promotion from year to year is higher for those who report patriotic motivations than it is for those who do not.

Ideally we would have longitudinal data to trace the promotion rates of those who report and fail to report patriotic reasons for entering the service. And in time, of course, the NLS data will supply a rich store of such data. At this point, however, only suggestive data are available. In Table 4-8 we present data about promotion to pay grades E-4 and over between the 1979 and 1980 administrations of the NLS survey. There we find evidence which confirms our analysis of Table 4-7. Those who were promoted to higher ranks tend by a large margin to be drawn from those who report having enlisted to serve their country.

In sum, we find a consistent pattern in the data in support of the proposition that those who are motivated to serve by patriotic reasons serve more effectively than those who enlist for other reasons. The evidence for this proposition is drawn both from subjective and objective assessments of role performance and from cross sectional as well as longitudinal analyses.

4. Summary

The major purpose of this chapter was to examine the impact of patriotic attitudes on military service. It

Table 4-8. Patriotic Motivation and Promotion to Pay Grades E-4 and Over, 1979-1980

Reported Patriotic Motivation	Promoted to Pay Grade E4	E5	E6-E9
Yes	69.2	72.5	100.0
No	30.8	27.5	0
	(173,443)	(42,422)	(908)

Source: NLS Youth Survey--1980.

constitutes an important link in our argument about patriotism overall. The persistence of patriotic attitudes--even their importance as motives for enlisting--matters very little if they do not affect the behaviors of those who enlist. What we have shown in this chapter is that these attitudes have behavioral consequences. People who enlist for patriotic reasons are more attracted than others to fill roles which are central to the military's mission. Because patriotic attitudes are not systematically associated with major cleavages in social background, their impact mitigates the trend toward overrepresentation of disadvantaged youths in combat and military-oriented roles. Finally, whether measured subjectively or objectively, those who serve for patrictic reasons serve more effectively than others.

Notes

(1) Melvin L. Kohn and Carmi Schooler, "Job Conditions and Personality: A Longitudinal Assessment of Their Reciprocal Effects," American Journal of Sociology, 87 (May, 1982), p. 1272.

(2) President's Commission on an All-Volunteer Force. (Washington, D.C.: 1970), p. 12.

(3) Ibid.

(4) Ibid., pp. 152-153.

(5) Ibid., p. 17.

(6) Ibid.

(7) See e.g. Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, Blacks and the Military, (Washington, D.C.: Brookings Institution, 1982), pp. 3-10; Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Making the All-Volunteer Force Work," Foreign Affairs (Fall, 1981), pp.

18-22; Morris Janowitz and Charles C. Moskos, Jr., "Five Years of the All-Volunteer Force: 1973-1978," Armed Forces and Society 5 (February, 1979); pp. 171-215.

(8) Jerald G. Bachman, John D. Blair and David R. Segal, The All-Volunteer Force, (Ann Arbor, Michigan: University of Michigan Press, 1977).

(9) Martin Binkin and Mark J. Eitelberg, op. cit., pp. 54-55, 169.

(10) Ibid., pp. 55-57, 173-175.

(11) Michael T. Anderson, Short Term Consequences of United States Army Basic Training. Ph.D. Dissertation Department of Sociology, University of Chicago, 1981.

CHAPTER V

THE LIMITS AND POTENTIALS OF PATRIOTISM IN THE CONTEMPORARY SETTING

Patriotism is a persistent and important factor affecting the quality and composition of the all-volunteer armed force. Because economic or market-based explanations of decisions to enlist and reenlist do not take this factor into account, they are seriously deficient. In this chapter, we will review the principal arguments and evidence which led us to this conclusion. Where appropriate, we will point out what we regard as being the practical implications of our research. In this way we hope to describe the limits and potentials of patriotism in the contemporary setting.

Patriotism is a complex attitude. We defined it as the readiness to act in the service of one's country. The attitude is composed of two parts. One part, dealing with the readiness to act, is based on sentiment, our feelings of attachment for and belonging to the territorial political community which defines the nation-state. Typically, definitions of patriotism only treat this aspect of the attitude. But they are incomplete. Sentiments make us ready to act, they do not tell us how to act. The second part of our definition deals with the beliefs that define what it means to serve one's country. We view this part as the critical component of patriotism. It is critical in two senses. First, narrowly, these beliefs imply a standard for

evaluating whether any particular action can be considered "patriotic." Second, it is critical in the sense that these beliefs are subject to transformation over time as we adapt to changing circumstances and learn from our national history. In the absence of war, the relevance of patriotic motives for decisions to enlist or reenlist in the military depend very much on the persistence of beliefs that military service is an appropriate way to serve one's country. It is noteworthy that throughout the years of the all-volunteer force, 80%-90% of career and two-thirds of first term Army enlisted personnel agreed that everyone should have to serve his countr in some way. The finding suggests that normative factors, especially the patriotic motive, remain important to those who serve, despite the emphasis over the last decade on economic incentives for joining the armed forces. The substantive results of our research document the fact.

Our first finding is that normative motives, to include patriotism, are at least as important as economic incentives for understanding why young people volunteer for military service. Over 70% of youths currently serving joined to serve their country and 73.4% joined to better themselves. In contrast to these normative commitments, only 13.1% of those currently serving said they joined to earn a better income and 19.3% said they joined because they were unemployed. The pattern of zero-order correlations among a set of reasons for enlisting supplements these findings. Normative and noneconomic motivations are highly intercorrelated while economic incentives are not,

suggesting that normative and noneconomic motives exert a cumulative and reenforcing influence which economic incentives do not. In addition, cluster analysis shows that the largest proportion of those who enlist characteristically do so from a desire to serve their country.

On the basis of these results, we believe that the present neglect of normative factors in models of military manpower analysis is unjustified. Future research designs should be expanded to take account of the patriotic variable and other normative factors which our study indicates are so important.

Our second finding is that socialization experiences within the family and among friends decisively affect the formation and transmission of patriotic attitudes. The distribution of these attitudes, put otherwise, does not vary systematically with class-based or ethnic cleavages. There is a very low level of correlation between race or educational attainment or father's occupation and the level of self-reported patriotic motivation. More important are the micro-processes of primary group influence exerted by family and friends. The data here are partial (although the influence of family and friends on decisions to enlist is well-established). But they document that those joining the armed forces because of family tradition are more likely than others--by 10 to 20 percentage points--to report having enlisted for patriotic reasons. Similiarly, 87.7% of those having military friends encouraging their enlistment say they enlisted to serve their country, while only 77.9% of

those having military friends discouraging their enlistment say they enlisted to serve their country.

In addition to microsocial processes, however, we argued that macrosocial factors are also important. The substance of patriotic attitudes transmitted on the microlevel is formed by the content of the country's political-cultural traditions and modified over time by current events, especially as they are reflected by the mass media.

These findings raise doubts about the efficacy of recruitment advertising which emphasizes individualistic and economic appeals. Such appeals, presented to markets targeted on the basis of selected social structural characteristics, may never reach a number of youths who are able and inclined to enlist for patriotic reasons. If they do reach such youths, they may raise questions about whether the military is different from civilian employment; it is essential to demonstrate the link between military service and service to one's country. Advertising may be more appropriate when it tells what the military is doing and what it has done. The emphasis is on describing in a straightfoward and matter-of-fact way the national service performed by those who enlisted in the past and who enlist today.

Of course, everything cannot be made to depend upon recruiting programs or even upon the leadership of military personnel. The issues we are dealing with extend beyond matters of professional socialization to encompass civic education. In a nuclear era, when deterrence is the primary military mission, it is essential that civilian political

leaders take the initiative to state explicitly how military activities are related to successful execution of the nation's foreign policy. It is appropriate for political leaders, as warranted by events, to express to the nation our collective appreciation of the achievements of the armed forces in keeping the peace.

The aim is not to recommend a policy either of "flag waving" or "saber rattling" for domestic display. It is to encourage a comparatively high level of critical discussion and thought about the role of the military in a democractic polity acting within the context of a nuclear age.

Our third finding is that those who enlist for patriotic reasons are more attracted than others to fill combat and military-oriented roles and that they perform better than others do in those roles. The self-selection of patriotically motivated personnel for combat roles is an important finding. Because patriotic attitudes are not systematically associated with social structural positions, those who are patriotically motivated tend as a group to be more socially representative than those who are not. This means that recruits who come from more advantaged social positions and serve in combat roles are very likely to have enlisted for patriotic reasons. As a practical matter, it means that enlistments based on patriotic motivations mitigate the trend toward overrepresentation of youths in combat and military roles. Finally, the role performance of those who enlist for patriotic reasons is higher than the performance of others. Measures of role performance are problematic, but the finding is sustained whether we use

subjective measures, like satisfaction with term of service or plans to reenlist, or objective measures, like the rate of promotion. Patriotic attitudes operate to improve the quality and composition of the enlisted armed force.

The importance of patriotic motives for enlisting and of their continuing impact during enlisted service is documented by the study. Continued neglect of the patriotic factor and of other normative factors in accounting for the composition and quality of the armed forces can hardly be justified. This is not to deny that many questions beyond those raised here still need to be addressed.

Attention ought to be given, in particular, to study how patriotic motivations, with which a vast majority enter the military, can be built upon to provide individual and group motivation and cohesion sufficient to cope with the difficulties, uncertainties, and contradictions of military service. The possibility for disillusionment and for the erosion of patriotic attitudes is suggested by our finding that enlistees not yet serving are much more likely than those already serving to report enlisting for patriotic reasons.

Nonetheless, the persistence and importance of patriotic motives is clear. They have probably eased the transition to an all-volunteer force. Yet their continuing positive contribution to the quality and composition of armed forces should not be taken for granted. Current emphasis on economic incentives and the and neglect of normative motives alters the social definition of what it means to serve in the military. For patriotic actives to be effective, the

military must be regarded by civilians and soldiers alike as a special institution through which one can perform a national service.

APPENDIX A

DESCRIPTION OF SURVEYS

Data for this report are drawn from two sources: The National Longitudinal Survey (NLS) of Youth--1980 and the Armed Forces Entrance and Examinaton Station (AFEES) Survey of 1979. The purpose of this appendix is to provide a brief description of the surveys. Both descriptions are taken from documentation supplied with the survey data.

NLS Youth Survey--1980

The NLS Youth Survey is a stratified probability sample of youth divided into two parts, nonmilitary and military.

The first part consists of a sample of youths (N=11,406) between the ages of 14 and 21 on January 1,1979. Members of this sample were not members of the military at the time of the initial survey done in 1979. They were chosen for inclusion according to selection criteria designed to produce large subsamples in each of the following groups:

Hispanic Males (n=946)
Hispanic Females (n=978)
Black Males (n=1,444)
Black Females (n=1,479)
Nonhispanic, Nonblack, Economically Disadvantaged Males (n=744)
Nonhispanic, Nonblack, Economically Disadvantaged Females (n=899)

Nonhispanic, Nonblack Males (n=2,441)
Nonhispanic, Nonblack Females (n=2,475)

All respondents are assigned weights in such a way as to produce group population projections when used in tabulations.

The second part consists of a sample of youths (n=1,280) who were between the ages of 17 and 21 on January 1,1979 and who were serving in the military. These respondents were selected from a roster provided by the Department of Defense. Women were sampled at a rate approximately six times that used for males. This resulted in a subsample of 823 male military personnel and a subsample of 457 female personnel.

By 1980, the total number of youths in the population who had some military expeience exceeded 1,280. Some (n=209) included in the nonmilitary part of the 1979 survey had already served in the military. Others (n=212) who had not served before, enlisted between the dates of the 1979 and 1980 interviews. In all, the total number in the sample with some military experience equals 1,701. The summary table below indicates their military status as of 1980.

Out of the service by 1979 (n=209)
Serving in 1979, out by 1980 (n=109)
Serving in 1979 and 1980 (n=1,171)
Enlisted 1980 and serving (n=128)
Enlisted 1980, not yet serving (n=84)

As in the first part, all respondents were assigned weights in such a way as to produce group population projections when used in tabulations.

One final note is required. Although a number of people

who have served, but are no longer serving, are included in this second part of the youth sample, critical data about their reasons for enlisting and their reasons fo getting out either were not gathered or were not coded. Consequently, we were not able to include a section which compared the experience of those currently serving with those not serving. (Similarly, the number serving in the Guard or in the Reserves was too small to permit detailed analysis here.) Unless otherwise noted, our use of this survey is confined to those currently serving in 1979 and 1980.

AFEES Survey--1979

The AFEES Survey is formally titled the 1979 DoD Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service: Wave 2.

The 1979 DoD Survey of Personnel Entering Military Service was administered to enlistees at the Armed Forces Entrance Examination Stations (AFEES) immediately after they were sworn in. The purpose of the survey was to provide the Office of the Secretary of Defense (OSD) and the military Services with data that can be used in policy formulation and research, especially in the areas of accession and first-term attrition of Active force enlisted personnel. It is the only survey administered to personnel in all four services at an identical point in their military career, i.e. immediately on enlistment.

The survey was designed to be administered in two

questionnaire variants, one focused primarily on the enlistment process, the other on identifying possible predictors of attrition. Both variants contain a common set of items designed to collect background information about the individual. In addition, to study possible differences between individuals who enlist at different times of the year, the survey was administered in two phases, 6 calendar months apart. The first phase of the survey, wave 2 (Forms 3 and 4), was administered in September-October 1979. Data collection took place at all 67 APEES stations.

Sample Design and Response Rates

Most of the information collected in the 1979 APEES survey relates to the enlistment decision process and to the characteristics and experiences of the individual prior to enlistment. To take maximum advantage of the enlistees' recall of information, the questionnaires were administered as close to the enlistment decision point as possible and before they had military experience. These considerations, combined with a legal requirement prohibiting survey of individuals until after they have been sworn into the Armed Forces, led to a design that limited respondents to men and women without any prior military service who were Active Force accessions and who would be interviewed as soon as possible after the enlistment decision point. In practical terms, this meant interviewing individuals who were going into the Delayed Entry Program (DEP) or who were being processed and sent directly to training.

To simplify administration and provide sufficient cases

for analyses of various subgroups, e.g., Service, region, recruiting district and educational group, the design called for interviewing 100 percent of the survey-eligible respondents during two designated 20-day periods. We estimated that 18,000 to 25,000 survey-eligible individuals would be processed during each of the 20-day periods. Since we planned to administer two somewhat different questionnaires simultaneously, the expected samples for each questionnaire were simply 50 percent of the survey-eligibles at each AFEES during the 20 days. The Wave 2 survey was actually conducted in the period between 4 September and 6 November 1979, depending on the AFEES station, and a total of 15,219 questionnaires were returned.

The instructions for sample selection were straightforward. Rand monitored the survey administration through periodic telephone calls to the AFEES. Preliminary indications suggest, nevertheless, that some AFEES did not always follow the instructions for collecting data and identifying respondents.

To verify the sample composition, the sampling criteria were applied to the U.S. Army Recruiting Command (USAREC) accession records for all individuals processed between September and November. A post hoc sample was then selected using the actual survey administration dates for each AFEES. This sample of 27,831 individuals should include the accession record of each individual who completed a questionnaire as well as of each who was survey-eligible but did not return a questionnaire.

Using information in the questionnaires, we tried to link

the 15,880 questionnaires with the USABRC records. The linkage identified 307 questionnaires that were completed by ineligible individuals, and these were removed from the files. The response rate was 56 percent. If our current analysis reveals no substantial differences between the characteristics of those who returned surveys and those who did not, the data can be used without weights or additional adjustments. If a bias is found, corrective measures will have to be taken.

Contents of the Data Files

The 1979 AFEES Survey is comprised of four questionnaires: Forms 1 and 2 administered in Wave 1 (spring), and Forms 3 and 4, administered in Wave 2 (fall). The questionnaire development process for the survey was guided by two major considerations: (1) relevance of the items to important policy issues relating to accession and first-term attrition and (2) accommodation of the research needs of as large a group of potential users as possible.

It became apparent in designing Wave 1 pretest questionnaires that even a minimum set of analytic requirements could not be met in one questionnaire. Such a questionnaire would have required well over an hour of each respondent's time. To decrease respondent burden, two questionnaires were designed, with many of the items included in both. In addition to the common set, items designed to collect detailed information about the enlistment process were clustered in Form 1. A group of items identified as possible predictors of attrition ,

together with items asked specifically of female enlistees, were clustered in Form 2. The Wave 2 questionnaires continued this broad substantive distinction between the two forms; Form 3, like Form 1, emphasized enlistment; Form 4, like Form 2, emphasized attrition and issues related to women.

APPENDIX E

TECHNIQUES OF ANALYSIS

The methods used in this report are, on balance, not complicated. Except for the cluster analysis of Chapter II, they do not bear extended treatment. A brief description of the clustering technique we used is provided below.

We used an algorithm called "fastclus" which is part of the SAS statistical package. It is based on the Euclidean distance computed from one or more quantitative variables for each respondent. The aim is to minimize the sum of squared distances from the cluster means within each cluster. As a result, the distance between cluster centers is less than the distances separating members of different clusters. We used the technique, therefore, as the appropriate one to separate respondents having different patterns of response to the question, "for what reasons did you enlist?".

The cluster outcomes do not lend themselves easily to statistical evaluation. Because the procedure separates like from unlike repondents, even observations drawn from a random sample are likely to be clusterd in ways that produce statistically significant means on a variable between clusters. What is the appropriate inference to the population? population? Analysis of variance, in other words, is inappropriate.The validity of any clustering

outcome for the present at least, still depends on its h uristic value.

For more information on this procedure, consult the current SAS Manual, 1982, and references cited there.

APPENDIX C

A NOTE ON THE TERM "NONECONOMIC INCENTIVE"

We undertook this research to compare the relative importance of economic and noneconomic incentives for enlistment into the armed forces. We knew at the outset that consideration of patriotic motives would be an important part of our endeavor. As the title of our report suggests, patriotism has become a central theme for this work. In contrast, the phrase "noneconomic incentives" is nowhere mentioned outside this preface. The shift in emphasis does not indicate any failure to do what we set out to do. It indicates instead the result of our research.

As work progressed, the notion of "noneconomic incentives" proved troublesome to us on two counts. First, theoretically, the concept, "incentive," seemed to us inevitably to convey the idea of an external reward which one received on performing some particular act. As such, it tied us to a process of exchange essentially economic in its structure. It tied us, in other words, to thinking about supposedly noneconomic factors in the same way we think about economic factors. Second, empirically, the term "noneconomic" was not useful. It is a negative term. It lumps together all motivations which are not "economic" without any sort of differentiation. We found such a category to be too crude and so we adopted other terms that better suited our purpose.